Resistance tactics varied after more than a year of back and forth with the occupation forces. With each new stage, the resistance seeks to diversify its attack methods. In the last week of December, there was a revolution of knives, penetrations, and explosive belts, in addition to the traditional inventory that had accompanied the battle since the beginning of the aggression.
In the north of the sector, which the “generals’ plan” turned into scorched earth, the resistance turned it into a “snake hunting” scene. The blessed land will not betray its owners. Abu Ubaida quickly appears to detail the outcome of the round. He refers to the “inspiring heroics of the resistance fighters” for all the free people of the world. He challenges the enemy to reveal his losses.
The occupation army is no longer able to resolve battles as it was. The conditions for those fleeting victories were confiscated only from history. The resistance was born to deter “deterrence” and to defeat the invincible army.
Dry arm
“The withered arm” is a translation of the Hebrew expression “the plantings of Hayabshah.” This is an adjective given to the occupation army, as a metaphor for its victorious struggle with the Arab armies, which in most rounds were easily defeated.
From the Nakba of 1948 until the defeat of June 1967, the Zionist army was able to win its lightning wars. But the resistance proved that the dry arm could break. This is one of the facts of the flood about which no two rational people would disagree.
It is no secret to anyone that the Zionist project is a “settler-replacement” project, which was established through the ability to violate international resolutions and sustain the state of militarization. It is not surprising that the construction of the entity state coincided with the announcement by the Prime Minister of the Interim Government, David Ben-Gurion, of the birth of the Zionist Army on May 26, 1948. This coincidence proved that the military is the backbone of the Zionist project, and that violence is an “essential organic feature” of the entity that dominates the region. .
Herzl described the Zionist idea as a “colonial idea.” It was natural for its army to bear the characteristics of colonial armies in its composition, ideology, and combat performance. And to internalize on the field the colonial methods of subjugating peoples.
It is no wonder that the Zionist army was established from the burning ashes of the British Mandate in Palestine, and from the smoke of battles in the war between the Arabs and the Zionist gangs in 1948. If we add to that colonial nature the settlement aspect of the Zionist project, we understand the reality of militarization.
Settler societies are, by nature, military societies, given that “the settler myth cannot be put into practice except by force of arms.” In the face of security concerns and constant sensing of threat, the entity state often maintains a high readiness for deterrence. In addition to the state of general mobilization and constant alert. This added to the militarization of the state the militarization of society, and the “armed nation” was born, as the Israelis say about themselves.
Thus, over the course of seven decades or more, the entity state has established one of the most powerful professional armies in the world. It was the force guaranteeing the existence of that state. During the rounds of conflict with the Arab armies, he was the most capable of starting and ending battles.
Previous rounds of conflict
The first round of conflict in the Arab-Zionist wars came with the end of the British Mandate in 1947. Zionist gangs fought against the weak Arab armies in a war that the Zionists called the War of Independence, which was nothing but the Nakba War. Despite the cruelty of the Nakba, history will continue to preserve a bright memory for some Arab soldiers, such as the Mujahid Abdul Qader Al-Husseini.
The Zionist gangs defeated the Arab regular armies through military operations and international conspiracies. The entity state was the price for their victories. The year 48 began to be viewed as a “sacred year” and as the “formative source” of the entity. Then the gangs turned into the “Defense Army.”
It was the first army in history to reproduce from gangs of killing and destruction. It was understood that the morals of the nascent army would be compatible with the morals of the friendly gang, so that “the military behavior of Israeli soldiers on the battlefield in 1948 would become a model for future generations,” as Chomsky said. As for the Arabs, that war represented a violent shock that “overthrew many of the existing political and intellectual assumptions and replaced them with new ones.”
No sooner had the Arabs overcome the catastrophe of the state of independence than the setback of the nation-state came. The defeat of June 1967 was another round on the path of accumulating defeats. During which the Arabs were led into a severe defeat in a few days.
The lightning war at dawn on June 5 succeeded in putting the Egyptian aviation out of service. This is true on the Jordanian and Syrian fronts. By the end of the battle, the occupation army was seizing new lands. Egypt lost Sinai and Gaza. Jordan lost the West Bank and Jerusalem. Syria lost the Golan Heights. Thus, the occupying state expanded its strategic depth.
This momentous event changed much of the reality of the Arabs, whose hearts were filled with a constant feeling of defeat. The Arab intelligence state collapsed, and social democracy collapsed with it. Defeat was the objective equivalent of the Arab oppressive state and its humiliated citizen. Through these easy battles, the Zionist army gained the status of an invincible army.
Combat doctrine
Despite the partial victory in the 1973 Transit War, the Zionists continued to control the field initiative. The occupying state’s security doctrine was formed in light of the two wars – the two defeats. It is a doctrine based on “strengthening the power of deterrence and strategic warning, then speeding up the decision.”
But after the July 2006 war, Zionist reviews were guided by the necessity of recognizing the end of all-out wars. Limited and asymmetric confrontations with non-state organizations (Hezbollah, Hamas, and others) have become the prevailing pattern, while the importance of comprehensive wars between countries has decreased.
In any case, these defeats and calamities have awakened the spirit of debate about the state and politics in Arab contexts. The ideological clash took place over the issues of freedom, liberation, resistance, and ways to rise after defeat. Other approaches to conflict management emerged.
Al-Aqsa flood
Since the second intifada, the military confrontation has shifted from regimes to organizations. That is, from a conflict with the regular armies to a conflict with the resistance. This means shifting from regular wars to asymmetric wars.
Gaza in particular has witnessed several rounds of conflict. From 2008 until 2023, the tours continued frequently. It was the Battle of “Al-Furqan” in 2008, the Battle of “Shale Stones” in 2012, the Battle of “Eating Storm” in 2014, and the Battle of “Saif Al-Quds” in 2021. Then came the flood. Through these accumulations, the resistance’s state of intractability was built.
The flood was its conclusion. During the flood, the resistance was facing the civilized West and its advanced base, in light of Arab silence, some of which amounted to participation in the war effort of the occupying army. However, the resistance in Gaza was able to harm the enemy. The new round was the most difficult test for the occupation army.
Despite the significant imbalance in the balance of power, the resistance has combined military decisiveness, intelligence awareness and the ability to read the stage. In addition to unprecedented knowledge of the enemy, it facilitated planning and implementation.
When it initiated a surprise attack, it deprived the occupying army of the privilege of a first strike. It came to him by land, sea and air. They killed, captured, displaced, seized control, and fought fierce battles in the cover cities until the occupation army seemed to be in a state of complete paralysis. When he tried to regain the initiative, the resistance was several steps ahead of him.
The ground war was no less cruel to the Zionists. The occupation army entered the war in a state of moral collapse. In the face of intelligence failure, he was unable to successfully build his military operations, so he drowned in the sands of Gaza. When the two armies met, each city in the Strip was a state in its own right and an army in its own right. Gaza turned all of Gaza into a burning land.
The resistance suddenly appears. It carries out its combat missions with missiles, explosive devices, or mines, thus attacking the enemy. It thickens in its mechanisms and then disappears. In all of this performance, the occupier was deprived of achieving his goals.
In the language of goals, the resistance was more realistic. Netanyahu’s goals have been in vain. Because the war on Gaza is an “unwinnable war.” While the “Flood” was able to trivialize the narrative of the occupation, end the political marketing of its historical injustice, and stop the state of Arab decline. Most importantly of all, the “withered arm” was broken.
The opinions expressed in the article do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Tel Aviv Tribune Network.