The Times of Israel published an analysis stating that while Israel is still in Gaza, it has no good options in Lebanon, but it might invade it anyway.
The analysis’s author, Lazar Berman, explained that the Israeli army and the home front are exhausted, and a military attack against Hezbollah will not defeat this party, but the success of the pager operation could provide a way for Israel to exit.
He added that even before hundreds of pagers exploded on Hezbollah fighters on Tuesday, a major escalation between Israel and Hezbollah was increasingly likely.
But if Netanyahu does decide to take the initiative against Hezbollah, there is no guarantee that he will achieve the desired result, and moreover, it will make it unlikely that Israel will achieve its other three war goals: toppling Hamas, releasing the hostages, and ensuring that Israel will not be threatened from Gaza in the future in the south.
Israel’s options in the north
Regarding Israel’s options for launching a military campaign in Lebanon, Berman said that it could carry out an air strike, either against the Lebanese state or targeting Hezbollah only.
Attacking the Lebanese state infrastructure would be a continuation of Israel’s traditional approach to non-state enemies, pressuring state actors to rein in militias within their borders. This approach was used effectively against Egypt and Jordan to stop Palestinian guerrilla attacks from their territory in the 1950s and 1960s, and until the Syrian regime withdrew its forces in 2005, Israel also sought to use Syria (the most powerful player in Lebanon) to stop attacks by the PLO and then Hezbollah on northern Israel and the IDF.
But this approach, according to Berman, assumes either that the weak Lebanese state will act to rein in Hezbollah, or that public criticism will force Hezbollah to agree to a ceasefire. But this approach has failed in the past, and given Lebanon’s dysfunction and economic collapse, it is unlikely to succeed today.
Aircraft and artillery
Meanwhile, the campaign against Hezbollah itself, using aircraft and artillery, would be a continuation of three decades of inconclusive Israeli military operations. Israel has relied on air power, trying to deter Hezbollah and Hamas from attacking it rather than seeking a decisive victory on the ground. Hamas’s attack on October 7 underscored how failed that approach has been.
Instead, the author says, Israel could adopt in the north the current approach it has adopted in Gaza by flooding Lebanon with ground forces, then slowly uprooting Hezbollah from villages and tunnels while searching for weapons stockpiles.
But the Israeli army was not finished with the job against the much smaller Hamas, and was able to keep large numbers of reservists in reserve for only a few months, before their patience wore thin.
A longer, deadlier war in Lebanon with a tired reserve force and home front would only add to the growing frustration over the management of the conflict since October 7, and would bring months of rocket attacks on an exhausted society with tens of thousands of internally displaced persons, a stagnant economy and families at war for nearly a year, Berman continued.
Moreover, drawing the Israeli army back into southern Lebanon for months—if not years—provides Hezbollah with an opportunity to wear down the conventional occupying army until it flees.
Limited ground penetration
The final option is a limited ground incursion to create a kind of buffer zone in southern Lebanon. Northern Command chief Uri Gordin has floated the idea, according to Israel Hayom, citing the flight of Lebanese civilians and Hezbollah fighters from the border. The incursion could also serve as a bargaining chip to force the party to agree to a diplomatic solution.
However, according to Berman, the buffer zones were not particularly effective for Israel, as any operation that did not severely damage Hezbollah and force it to redeploy away from the border would likely end in another ceasefire agreement, as it has done in the past.
Israel now finds itself in a predicament of its own making, Berman continued. For years, it neglected its ground forces and bought the theory of victory from the air, along with defensive technologies such as the Iron Dome and fences, for billions of dollars. This approach allowed Hamas and Hezbollah to grow from a group of small cells into an army capable of invading Israel and closing its home front.
Two complex wars at once
This approach also limits Israel’s options today, as the limited availability of ground formations has slowed the operation in Gaza, forcing Israel to fight two complex wars at once.
Berman quoted military theorist Eran Ortal as saying that as of September there was no realistic option for achieving a decisive victory over Hezbollah, that the complete military superiority enjoyed by the Israeli army for three decades was eroding, and that Hamas and Hezbollah now possess capabilities linked to state armies.
Former Israeli Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi was also quoted as saying that the challenge the IDF will face against Hezbollah and Hamas is that their militants are located in the heart of urban areas in a decentralized manner, making it very difficult to locate and destroy them, while allowing them to attack the Israeli home front effectively over time.
Kochavi called for increased lethality of ground forces, improved connectivity between pilots, infantry, tanks and drones, and better battlefield sensors to pinpoint the enemy’s location first.
Ortal urged Israel to take advantage of its time and develop its capabilities so that it can fight a decisive war, saying, “If we go to Lebanon now, we will have to do it again in another two years. It is better not to do it twice.”
Save Hamas
The writer pointed out that Israel’s dilemma in the north has become more disturbing with the pace of its campaign in Gaza. After 11 months from October 7, the fact remains that Hamas is still capable of retaking the Gaza Strip and rebuilding its army whenever Israel withdraws.
If Israel decides to launch a ground operation against Hezbollah, reaching an agreement or a decisive move against Hamas becomes less likely as more forces are moved north.