The Al-Aqsa Flood War shook the foundations of the Hebrew state and undermined the Israeli army’s self-confidence. Although this army has enormous destructive capabilities, the length and consequences of the war and the difficulties it faced in resolving it, whether in the Gaza Strip or in Lebanon, prompted its leadership to try to draw lessons and embody them on the ground.
It is obvious that the matter is related to the theory and tools of combat after testing them in the field. Among the first victims of drawing lessons was the “small, smart army” theory that has governed the process of building force in the Israeli army for more than two decades. It has been proven that – despite the importance of the air force and intelligence – without a capable ground army, the goals of war cannot be achieved or resolved.
According to Maariv, the war demonstrated that there is absolutely no substitute for ground forces on the battlefield, as the soldier and the tank are the decisive factor in every defense and attack. It also demonstrated the army’s need for its regular and reserve pillars, as Israel cannot remain security-wise without its reserve forces.
Obviously, this means the disappearance of the theory of a “small, smart army” from the Israeli scene after October 7. Therefore, Maariv saw that the Israeli army is currently in a race against time. To rebuild his ground forces, this involved significantly increasing the size of a number of ground sectors, the first of which was the armored corps. The question is: Will this weapon, in its regular strength, increase by double or less?
When talking about the armored weapons, the focus is on the production of hundreds of Merkava “Siman 4” tanks, which are produced in Israel and include many components imported from America, Germany, Britain, and others. Due to the difficulties facing the world’s arms industries as a result of the Ukraine war, and the escalating conflicts in other regions, this is impossible to achieve quickly, which prompted Israel not to implement the decision to remove the Merkava “Siman 3” tanks from service.
This means repairing those tanks that would have been sold after restoration to poor countries, or sold as scrap, or used as spare parts. However, despite this, Israel needs huge quantities of spare parts required for this repair process, and for the process of restoring hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles that were either injured or damaged due to their excessive use during the war, thus accelerating their aging.
Before the war, the Israeli army was equipped with a few dozen modern tanks annually as part of a plan to modernize its armored fleet. But war has its requirements, especially in light of the heavy losses in armor. The lack of funds weakens the army’s ability to meet its needs for these armored vehicles.
The army is now required to prepare for a long war on the one hand, and with multiple fronts on the other. Last July, the army admitted that there was a shortage of combat-ready armored vehicles. Because it was severely damaged in the war. Thus, if the army was previously satisfied with absorbing a few tanks per month, it currently needs a much faster pace.
In addition to the armored weapon, the war arose the need to renew and expand the artillery weapon, which proved its necessity. Despite the extensive modernization of the Israeli army’s weapons, most of its artillery production dates back to the 1960s, while new generations of artillery have developed.
Israel produces modern cannons on a small scale, but they are insufficient, and accelerating production in the current circumstances has become more difficult. Due to the boycott campaigns it is being exposed to, which prevent the access of essential components from abroad.
The same also applies to ammunition production, as the army suffered from a shortage of ammunition imported from abroad, whether smart or dumb shells, and even raw explosive materials. During the war, several Israeli companies were pressured, most notably Al-Bayt, to open production lines for these ammunition, especially 120 mm shells for cannons and tanks.
Maariv’s military correspondent, Avi Ashkenazi, published at the end of last month that among the reasons for Israel’s acceptance of the ceasefire agreement was the difficult situation of the Israeli Air Force. Netanyahu also mentioned in his justifications for accepting the agreement “the need to replenish the stock of weapons and equipment.”
The newspaper’s military correspondent, Avi Ashkenazi, pointed out that “the biggest challenge facing Israel the day after the ceasefire is not in Lebanon, but in the United States and Germany. Israel needs to use the capabilities of the Israeli army in massive purchases of weapons systems, combat aircraft, helicopters and tanks.” And cannons, missiles, and different types of weapons.”
“Maariv” wrote, “The most dangerous situation in which the Israeli army finds itself is the formation of helicopters, with a focus on Apache squadrons. Also regarding armament, the Israeli army is constantly monitoring the amount of air-to-surface bombs that have accumulated on the Air Force’s combat aircraft.” Thousands of flying hours per aircraft during the war, exceeding the previously planned lifestyle – has caused all of the force’s combat aircraft to age and will force Israel to move forward with the purchase of new squadrons, with a focus on F-15s. 15, and F-35”.
Ashkenazi explained, “All the Air Force’s combat aircraft have spent thousands of flying hours in the war and their attrition is great. The most complex situation is the Falcon-F15 squadrons of the older model.”
During the war, the United States provided some used aircraft to the Air Force. But there is an urgent need to move forward with the delivery of back-ordered aircraft; Due to the whim of Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who insisted on studying the need to equip the army with combat aircraft.
On the other hand, the economic newspaper “Globes” published some of the problems of the Air Force, especially the helicopter system. Initial investigations in the army revealed that on the morning of October 7, there were only two combat helicopters on standby. In the last decade, the army has reduced the size of its combat helicopter system, and no longer has only two squadrons of Apache helicopters.
An insider from the committee examining the size of the forces said, “In addition to the shortage of combat helicopters, there is a shortage of ammunition such as Hellfire missiles, as well as squadrons of combat aircraft and transport helicopters. The reason is that the Air Force’s budget is 20% less than what is required, which prevents expansion.” in purchasing aircraft.
Israel also intends to increase the size of the so-called territorial protection system, and to transform battalions that were until now composed of reserve forces into regular battalions. In addition, the establishment and strengthening of reserve regional protection battalions attached to regional military divisions, especially in the north.
The army says it also needs to strengthen border intelligence collection systems, and increase the size and number of female monitoring recruits. According to the Israeli media, among the lessons learned in the war is the necessity of increasing the combat engineering corps by a high percentage.
In any case, the Israeli army has already entered into a state of intensifying procurement to meet its needs. The Israeli Ministry of War announced that within a year of the war, it had significantly increased its orders from 86 new Israeli companies, five times what it was before the war.
In any case, it is clear, according to Israeli economists, that the burden and costs of the war are estimated at hundreds of billions of shekels (at least 100 billion dollars), and that this may return Israel to the time of the “lost decade” that followed the October 1973 war. They explain that in the face of risks and the army’s need to rebuild its strength, the Netanyahu government must make the right decision regarding the general budget, and the army and security share of it.
It is known that the army’s budget was more than $30 billion, and that it will be supplemented by requirements to compensate for losses in equipment, refill ammunition stores, and meet the requirements for expanding and renewing the force. It is mentioned here that America pays Israel, under the current military aid agreement, $3.3 billion annually, in addition to $500 million to support specific weapons development and production projects.
This indicates that the Israeli army is facing major financing difficulties related not only to purchasing equipment and ammunition, but also to salaries, compensation, and the costs of manpower that must be increased in large numbers.
For example, the Ministry of Finance announced that it was preparing a program to reduce the salaries of regular service soldiers. Given that the army has always competed with the private sector to retain talent in its ranks, it needs to increase salaries and bonuses to ensure this.
Media outlets indicated that the latest increase in the salaries of regular forces took place recently, and that the Ministry of Finance considers this increase to be incorrect and is working to stop it. This item constitutes only one aspect of the eternal conflict between the army and the Ministry of Finance, this time over the 2025 budget. Given that the draft general budget talks about reducing public sector salaries by no less than 2.5% in 2025, and 1.2% in 2026, the Ministry Finance demands that this apply to army salaries.
In conclusion, there is a consensus in Israel about the necessity of preparing for long wars in the future. These are the lessons of war that demonstrated the error of greatly reducing the size of the ground army, which led to difficulties in the ability to decide. According to General Ron Tal: “They thought wars could be won from the air. This theory has collapsed.”
The opinions expressed in the article do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Tel Aviv Tribune Network.
