The Egyptian proposal for the reconstruction and administration of Gaza has become an urgent intervention in the crisis which has taken place since October 7, 2023. Supported by the Arab states, the organization of Islamic cooperation, and several European nations, the plan is not simply a humanitarian initiative – it is a humanitarian initiative pushed by the geopolitical Prime Minister of Benjamin de Benjamin de Benjamin de Benjamin de Benjamin de Benjamin de Benjamin Diagram by the Prime Minister of Benjamin Geopolitic Benjamin of Benjamin de Benjamin de Benjamin de Benjamin de Benjamin de l’Osraelie Geopolitique Benjamin de Benjamin de Benjamin de Benjamin de Benjamin de Benjamin de Benjamin de Benjamin de l’Osraelie by the diagram of Israeli. Netanyahu, and recently supported by US President Donald Trump, to depopulate the Gaza Strip.
For several months, Arab states hesitated to enter into the role of Gaza’s reconstruction and governance without a full initiative to resolve the fundamental question of Palestinian statelessness. Indeed, they resisted to rely on the role of a Palestinian authority (PA) 2.0, softening the responsibilities of Israel as a force of occupation while the Israelis continued their colonial expansion in the West Bank. However, the existential threat posed by Trump’s vision and Netanyahu for Gaza forced them to action.
Basically, the reconstruction plan of $ 53 billion in Egypt is based on the creation of a local steering committee made up of technocrats during the first six months, with a transition to the control of the AP afterwards. But this approach includes fundamental problems which could condemn the failure plan before it is even implemented.
Netanyahu’s obstructionism
The Israeli Prime Minister was clear in his opposition to any role of AP in Gaza. Its position is strategic: allowing the AP to administer the territory would open the door to the geopolitical unit between Gaza and the West Bank, a springboard to renew negotiations for a Palestinian state.
For decades, Netanyahu and the political establishment of Israel worked to prevent any scenario which could lead to Palestinian self -determination. The status quo of the fragmentation and the division between the Palestinian territories serves their interests, keeping the purpose of the state perpetually out of reach.
To effectively counter Netanyahu, Arab states need the membership of as many other actors as possible, in particular the Trump administration, which has the lever to force the Israeli Prime Minister to accept.
While Netanyahu can still seek to undermine its implementation by bureaucratic obstacles, military escalations or economic restrictions – part of a well -used Israeli gaming book – the Arab plan remains the best option on the table to prevent the ethnic cleaning of Gaza through renewed war and long -term deprivation.
An AP in crisis
Beyond the Israeli resistance, there is another major obstacle to the implementation of the Arab plan: AP. Under President Mahmoud Abbas, it is a deeply unpopular institution, devoid of political relevance after the collapse of the Oslo agreements.
Over the years, Abbas has accelerated the erosion of its legitimacy by continuing to coordinate security with Israel, by deepening its authoritarian domination and by refusing to hold elections since 2006. His management has been increasingly defined by repression – factions of opposition, political renewal and any resistance to Israeli aggression.
Without a viable political process, the AP has become an appendix to the occupation and apartheid of Israel, applying security in the West Bank while lacking real authority to govern as an independent entity. This fueled generalized Palestinian disillusionment. Abbas’s grip on power required an increasingly heavy hand, in particular against activists and factions calling for a more conflictual approach to Israeli ethnic cleaning policies.
AP’s failure has been particularly blatant in the last 16 months of Israel’s genocidal aggressions against Gaza and the West Bank. Abbas was largely absent from efforts to mobilize the Palestinian resistance, his silence and his inaction reflecting his obsolescence.
His government has not only lost the confidence of the Palestinian people, but has also become largely out of words for broader geopolitical actors, notably Israel, the United States and the Arab states.
A political emptiness
Abbas’ dependence on Israel and international donors of the Palestinian Authority to maintain the authority afraid forces them to prioritize their demands on those of its people, who have largely contrary to each other. As its domestic popularity subsequently fell, its authoritarianism has become more severe.
More recently, he launched a repression against Palestinian resistance groups in the city of Jenin of the Northwest West Bank and eliminated the financial support of the families of the imprisoned Palestinians, killed or injured by Israel.
This decision, breaking a long -standing social pact between the Palestinian people and their leadership, has only emphasized to what extent AP seeks to appease Israel and the West to the detriment of legitimacy at home.
Now, faced with an urgent need for Palestinian governance in Gaza, the Arab states are without a real viable partner. The management of the existing AP is low, corrupt and probably unable to administer the band effectively.
Some in the Arab world, as well as Palestinian civil society and the diaspora, put pressure on a new leadership. However, Abbas and his loyalists resisted all these efforts. In mid -February, the PA prevented 33 delegates to a Palestinian National Conference which will be held in Doha – which was presented as a basic effort to revive the Liberation Organization of Palestine (PLO) – to leave the West Bank.
At the same time, with the aim of welcoming the opposition of the Arab government, Abbas has extended an amnesty offer to the dissatisfied members of Fatah, in particular Mohammed Dahlan, his rival supported by the water who lived in exile in Abu Dhabi.
Dahlan’s potential return could point out a change in the dynamics of Palestinian leadership, but that would not solve the central crisis of legitimacy distressing the AP. A political reshuffle at the top is not the same as the systemic reform, and without a broader commitment to national unity and the renewal of the representation, any new structure of leadership risks inheriting the same failures which defined the mandate of Abbas.
A moment of opportunity
The reconstruction of Gaza presents the opportunity to lay the foundations for a renewed Palestinian national movement by breaking Abbas’ workforce on Palestinian policy and boost the revitalization process. If Arab states can sail in the political mines of Netanyahu intransigence, the personal interest of Abbas and internal Palestinian divisions, they may be able to direct Gaza to a more stable and autonomous future.
However, if Abbas and its circle of rooted officials remain in control, this effort could quickly turn into another failed attempt of Palestinian reconciliation, reinforcing the status quo of Israeli domination and the Palestinian disunity.
The future of Gaza is at stake. This intervention by the Arab states could be a positive step towards Palestinian self -determination – or it could become a historical missed opportunity. If Abbas continues to monopolize power, if the OLP remains a hollow shell, and if Netanyahu continues its campaign to sabotage a form of Palestinian sovereignty, the Arab plan can be dead on arrival.
This moment calls for decisive action, a Palestinian political renewal and an international commitment to authentic Palestinian self -determination. It remains to be seen whether the plan of the Arab states can overcome structural obstacles on its way. But if the leadership crisis of the Palestinians has not already sealed the fate of Gaza, then it is the moment of correction of the course before it was too late.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Tel Aviv Tribune.
