Reverse migration will break Israel’s back policy

Analysts turned to the direct impact of the war launched by Tel Aviv against the Gaza Strip on the Israeli economy, such as the lack of foreign exchange reserves, which led to a deficit in the general budget, a contraction in economic growth, a high inflation rate, and a lowering of the credit rating of the Hebrew state.

But many did not pay attention to a deeper impact related to the economic role of the army, which goes beyond its direct projects, to its role in qualifying human resources to contribute to the state’s economies, through government and private civilian projects.

This impact is far from being erased by the urgent measures that the government will take to revive the economy, such as reducing spending, increasing revenues, especially from taxes, which are expected to reach 18% during the year 2025, reducing the funds granted to the political parties that form the ruling coalition, and abolishing unnecessary government ministries. And combating the black market.

Over the past decades, the Israeli army has played an important role in qualifying citizens for entrepreneurship, by enhancing their ability to innovate, create, and compete. Some of the values ​​and practices that govern compulsory conscription include a large portion of society, with the exception of the Haredim and Palestine.YIn 1948, Christians, like improvisation, avoid the negative effects of administrative hierarchy without the absence of organization, and learn to criticize, argue, and question, then assign through “financial funds,” and teach them how to market.

These values ​​and procedures have contributed to reviving the economy according to what is called “risk capitalism” for conscripts, and are also reflected in the role played by soldiers who are unfit to carry out combat missions, for health and other reasons, such as serving in civilian work for the benefit of the public, such as assisting teachers in government schools, and working On Army Radio.

Armies have a natural tendency towards discipline at the expense of flexibility, and this is different in the Israeli army. When one thinks of military doctrine, what comes to mind is strict hierarchy, absolute obedience to superiors, listening carefully to their orders, and compliance with the reality that each soldier is merely a small, uninformed component within a comprehensive system.

However, the Israeli army does not fit this description. Rather, there is an improvisational, anti-hierarchical culture that has encouraged Israelis to create their own fledgling companies, and it has become so remarkable that there are those who describe it as the magic of technology that Israelis acquire in elite military units.

An important aspect of the economic values ​​that the army injects into society is due to the decentralization of decision-making at the tactical field level. There is a general plan for all divisions, brigades, battalions, companies, and factions, but each field commander implements it according to the circumstances he is going through. With the ease of flow of orders and the exchange of instructions between senior and lower leaders, which enhances trust between them.

There are broad powers for the leaders of various formations, including the lower ones. A non-commissioned soldier with the rank of sergeant can call on the Air Force to provide him with field assistance or support. This teaches, without a doubt, the individual in the Israeli army, no matter how small his level or rank, confidence in decision-making and expectation of response, which is reflected in his performance after his release from military service and establishing his own project.

In general, we find that this economic and social role of the Israeli army is based on three basic considerations:

1. Establishing a military society, to compensate Israel for the lack of manpower, which prevents it from forming a large active army, and teaching the soldier that the goal of his service is nothing more than defending society, which means preparing the occupying society in a clear military manner, and making the army, in the end, an essential tool in The hand of the state.
2. Developing the population as a national and social force that can support itself economically, politically, culturally and militarily, creating a bloc capable of increasing its human capacity and productivity, and then subjecting all life in the occupying state to the needs of war. Hence, population, economy and politics had to become part of a long-term war strategy. Therefore, the entire society is integrated into the war effort, regardless of its components in terms of education, class, place of origin, and the hopes it places on the state.
3. The Israeli army represented the locomotive of technical progress in society, and this is in line with the function that the West wants for Israel as a deterrent force, which is the highest in spending on armaments in the countries of the Mediterranean basin, as it increased more than two hundred billion dollars in the ten years between 2010 and 2020.

The army has a declared budget within the general state budget, approved by the Knesset, and another secret budget called the “contract budget,” about which no one outside the army knows anything. It is an issue subject to review after the war on Gaza ends.

Shimon Peres, the former Prime Minister of Israel, expressed the role of the army in modernizing Israeli society by saying: “Every technology that reaches Israel from America comes to the army, and within five minutes they change it.”.

Every time that came to militarized Israel, those in charge of its affairs had to take advantage of this time to strengthen the state, so that it would maintain a measure of its independence from the West itself over time, that is, not to be a hostage at all times to its policies and interests, but rather its basic loyalty would be to its own interests, transgressing, on As much as possible, the role of the functional state.

Over time, a market culture based on economic control began to replace the traditional state of the “citizen-soldier” locked into political control. The army has been subjected to market competition, and military service has been commodified, and this simply means a lower level of participation by political institutions in shaping the decision of peace and war, compared to what was the case in the past.

The Israeli army has become market-oriented, based on the distinction between sacrificing money versus sacrificing the body. This takes place in a competitive atmosphere, in which the market law governs military practices and forces the army to market its services, allowing it to be penetrated by the media and establish a dialogue with the people. In order to promote what he produces, and thus the generals turn into public figures.

Market mechanisms have become the most effective and can challenge the supremacy of military thought by materially constraining the institution, especially when the cost of war becomes high relative to the indirect political and economic gains.

This trend makes the cost of war taken into account when the government decides to wage it, or when the war lasts for a long time, and this cost increases, and thus there are those who appear bored or fed up with this, whether they are military or engaged in civilian life, especially after having to call in a large number of soldiers. reserves, and keep them long on the battlefield.

The war comes to have a profound impact on the existing equation between the army, the economy and society in Israel. For example, the 2006 war accelerated the way civilian supervision of the military took place, i.e. market control.

The model of the soldier, through which the political community supervised the army through the social networks in which it served, was replaced by the soldier under the control of the market, where the commercially oriented control of his activity, arising from the change in his social composition, and the influence of the market-like competitive atmosphere that forces the army to market Its services by allowing media penetration and dialogue with the people directly, and the commodification of military service as part of the professionalization process.

Here, General Giora Eiland, who headed the Planning Division in the army and the National Security Council, believes that the 2006 war witnessed a deviation from the “pioneer model,” and occurred in four failures of the army: the poor performance of the combat units, especially on the ground, the weakness of the senior leadership, and the poor quality of its work.YThe lack of command and control, and the failure of the traditional values ​​that the army was accustomed to, as it was rare to go beyond preconceived and accepted ideas and have a mind open to new ideas.

The dominance of market mechanisms over the Israeli army in light of the exchange of benefits, through feedback between society and the army, contributed to making the economy more sensitive to the state the army is in, in peace or in war, and in the latter, whether it wins, falters, or is defeated, and whether Wage a lightning war, or get involved and unwell in a long war.

The war against Gaza had a negative impact on the Israeli economy in terms of small projects, the most fragile in it, and whose existence was one of the expressions of the cultural values ​​created by conscription in society in terms of initiative, decision-making ability and innovation, according to the perception of some Western economic researchers. Of the 46,000 companies that have closed their doors since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa flood on October 7, 2023, there are 35,000 small companies, a percentage of up to 77%. The number of closed companies is expected to reach 60,000 by the end of 2024.

Important economic sectors were damaged, such as building and construction, the trade and tourism sector, agriculture and some industries. The percentage of damage in the building and construction sector was about 27%, and the services sector was about 19%, while the industrial and agricultural sector was affected by about 17%, and the trade sector was affected by about 12%. The high-tech and advanced technologies industry was about 11%, and the food and beverage industry was affected by about 12%. 6%.

It is expected that the negative effects on the Israeli economy will deepen with the decline in the proportion of new immigrants, who have always been a major source of economic vitality. This expectation is based on previous experience showing that immigration to Israel increases when its army wins, and decreases when it falters or is defeated. For example, we find that between 1972 and 1973, about one hundred thousand new people immigrated to Israel, but the number declined to fourteen thousand in 1974, and approached zero in 1975.

With the decline in Jewish immigration to Israel, which created a driving force in the arteries of its economy, there is now a reverse migration, estimated by some to have reached about half a million people since the outbreak of the “Al-Aqsa Flood.”

This creates two factors that put pressure on this economy, the first of which is brain drain, where distinguished Jews, including those who acquired superior technical skills from their involvement in the army, prefer to leave the country, returning to other countries whose nationalities and passports they still hold.

The second factor is the weakness of the labor force, as approximately half participates in production, and Tel Aviv compensated for this with Palestinian labor coming from Gaza and the West Bank, which stopped due to the war.

What makes matters worse is that the Israeli economy is inherently more sensitive to any security threats, which leads to the reluctance of those qualified in intelligence, skills, and capital to invest in the Hebrew state.