The Palestinian issue enters the year 2024 in exceptional and unprecedented circumstances for decades, as the war on Gaza has loomed large since Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, which was carried out by the Al-Qassam Brigades, the military arm of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, on October 7.
The current confrontation is considered the most violent among the confrontations that the Palestinian resistance has waged in the Gaza Strip since Hamas took control of the Strip in the summer of 2007.
In addition to being the largest and most comprehensive war, the repercussions of this confrontation will constitute a new reality at the level of the Palestinian issue and the Gaza Strip. It will also affect the Israeli reality and the internal Palestinian political scene, and the confrontation in Gaza will impose itself on the regional and international environment on a large scale.
New stage
October 7 represented a qualitative development in the behavior of the Palestinian resistance in the Gaza Strip in terms of its initiative in an organized and widespread attack that included the “Gaza Envelope” settlement area.
The attack targeted Israeli military, security and intelligence sites and settlements, resulting in the “Gaza Division” in the Israeli occupation army being taken out of service.
The resistance was also able to capture dozens of soldiers, officers and civilians of the occupation army, and released a number of them in a partial exchange deal concluded with Qatari, Egyptian and American mediation last November.
With this attack, the resistance has ended a phase of Israel’s attempts to contain it and coexist with its presence and control over the Gaza Strip.
The resistance has set a new and escalating path in its behavior and response to the occupation’s violations in Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since the Battle of the “Sword of Jerusalem” in May 2021.
This is the stage in which the Palestinian resistance set broader parameters for its actions with the aim of confronting Israel’s efforts to impose its control in the West Bank and Jerusalem, annex them, expand settlement and Judaize them.
In contrast, Israel’s declaration of war constituted an abandonment of its previous strategy in dealing with the Gaza Strip by avoiding engagement with the Palestinian resistance in a broad and comprehensive confrontation that included a large ground invasion. It set goals for its war on Gaza by eliminating the Hamas movement, dismantling its military capabilities, and recovering Israeli prisoners held by the resistance. .
Nearly three months have passed since the start of the comprehensive war on the Gaza Strip, and despite the massive destruction that Israel inflicted on the Strip and the complete destruction of its infrastructure, the Palestinian resistance is still engaged in armed clashes with the Israeli occupation army in all areas of the Strip.
Impossible goals
Regarding the goal of eliminating Hamas and dismantling its capabilities, the events of the field battle raise great doubts about Israel’s ability to achieve its goal given the nature of the Hamas movement and the depth of its roots in the Palestinian situation in general, and in the Gaza Strip in particular. The movement, which has controlled the Gaza Strip for 17 years, has been able to build a deep organizational, political, military and social presence in the Gaza Strip.
Israel does not set clear criteria to measure the achievement of this goal, which requires it to impose long-term security and military control in the Strip to ensure this, which experts and analysts, including Israelis, doubt the ability to do.
Hamas’s ability to continue carrying out qualitative operations against the occupation army penetrating into the Gaza Strip and to prove this with the video clips it broadcasts, and to fire rockets at different depths, indicates the depth of the challenge that Israel faces in achieving this goal or the ability to bear the consequences of a long war of attrition for its forces in the Gaza Strip.
The prisoner recovery file also faces another challenge after Hamas announced the cessation of exchanges before the ceasefire and the army’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. The Israeli occupation army attempted to carry out special operations to liberate prisoners in the Gaza Strip, but they failed and incurred losses among the soldiers and prisoners to be liberated.
The day after the war
The day after the war, or the day that has been awaited for months, represents another challenge for Israel and its supporters in Washington. The ideas proposed to answer this dilemma do not have a real chance of being implemented due to the complexity of the scene in the Gaza Strip, and in the Palestinian and Israeli political environment.
As for proposing the presence of United Nations peacekeeping forces, rapid intervention forces, Arab police forces, or multinational forces to maintain stability and intervene to govern or even guard Gaza, they are all just theories that are difficult to implement.
Israel may find itself entangled in the Gaza Strip and will not find anyone to save it. Therefore, the only other option if Israel refuses to withdraw from the Gaza Strip is for it to remain an occupying force, which is something that occupation Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has indicated several times that he prefers to do, rather than The hope is to ensure that Hamas is unable to declare victory or regain control.
It will not be easy for Israel to go to this option, as it is possible for the Palestinian resistance to maintain its ability to continue fighting in open urban warfare at a low cost, and under exhausting conditions for the Israeli occupation army.
The resistance today can use simple means to confront army vehicles and soldiers and inflict losses on them, especially in urban areas where the resistance enjoys widespread popular support.
For its part, the Biden administration is presenting its approach to the day after the war by offering the option of returning a “renewed” Palestinian Authority to rule the Strip. The matter faces difficult challenges in light of the great popular rejection of this authority and its symbols, and the rejection of this option by the Netanyahu government and the extreme right-wing movement within it as well, because his vision is based on liquidating the Palestinian issue and any political manifestations of it, and even proposes plans to annex the West Bank and displace the Palestinians from it.
The absence of a realistic and applicable vision for the day after the war, and Israel’s inability to reoccupy the Gaza Strip and endure a war of attrition there, will force it to withdraw from it, but only after destroying it and re-imposing the siege on it. Which will leave the Palestinians with the option of continuing resistance to impose new facts through which the Hamas movement can restore its position.
Regional implications
The return of the Palestinian issue to the forefront and the continuation of the confrontation in Palestine in various forms and levels represent a new reality in the region. It will impose a new security and political environment, and move the region from the paths of integrating Israel into the regional political, security and economic system to a fragile and flammable environment at any moment.
The October 7 experience formed a new security and strategic concept for Israel, which faces security challenges with the Lebanese Hezbollah. The presence of groups such as Ansar Allah in Yemen and the armed factions loyal to Iran in Syria and Iraq has become different, imposing new security approaches on Israel and the United States.
The war on Gaza also affected the Arab popular environment, as the official Arab position is seen as being incapable of confronting the Israeli aggression, and did not play the required role in helping the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Which may result in popular reactions in the Arab environment similar to those that occurred after the 2008-2009 war.
The region, which the United States sought to move to a stage of stability and cooperation among its allies, enters the year 2024 in completely opposite circumstances. This opens the door wide to military and political escalation, and perhaps new social transformations.
This comes as the United States enters a decisive election year, in which the scene in the Middle East will have a major impact on its results.