Military and strategic expert Brigadier General Elias Hanna confirmed that the operation of October 7, 2023 is the second largest Israeli intelligence failure after the 1973 war, indicating that this event will remain entrenched in Israeli memory and awareness forever and ever.
An Israeli intelligence investigation revealed exciting details about the security breach carried out by the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) before the October 7 operation, as it succeeded in accessing sensitive information that included various military and security levels.
Israeli Channel 12 reported – in a detailed report – about Hamas’ success in hacking into the computers of Israeli security personnel and obtaining their names and phone numbers.
Hamas was also able to follow the movements of the heads of the Gaza envelope councils, security officers, and residents, in addition to penetrating Israeli internal systems and obtaining sensitive documents and information before the war began.
Brigadier General Hanna explained that planning for this operation began in 2014, following the “Eating Storm” operation, noting that the scale of the operation requires the collection of accurate and accumulated intelligence information over the years.
He added that Hamas relied on multiple dimensions in implementing the operation, including land, sea, air, and cyberspace.
Strategic planning
In a related context, the military expert pointed to the diversity of sources of intelligence collected by Hamas, which included electronic and human sources, as members of Hamas succeeded in infiltrating the settlements and the Gaza envelope to collect information about roads and basic locations.
Brigadier General Hanna pointed out that the planning was not limited to the operation only, but extended to include preparation for the Israeli reaction, stressing that the continuation of resistance 14 months after the operation indicates comprehensive planning for all stages.
Regarding the repercussions of this revelation on the Israeli internal level, the military expert pointed out that there was a conflict between the military and political institutions over defining responsibilities, which led to the resignation of many military and security leaders, including the person responsible for settlement security and the commander of the Gaza Division.
The military expert alerted to Israel’s excessive reliance on technology, noting the failure of the security wall, which cost about $1.2 billion, to prevent this process. He explained that the amount of cement used in its construction was sufficient to create a road extending from Gaza to Bulgaria.
Brigadier General Hanna concluded his analysis by referring to the attempts of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office to shift responsibility to other parties, stressing that this intelligence failure revealed a deep flaw in the Israeli security system and led to what he described as a “falling domino” of responsibilities.