The Israeli newspaper “Jerusalem Post” said that serious tactical errors contributed to the success of two attacks carried out by Lebanese Hezbollah with drones on the Air Force traffic control base in Mount Meron, and on the headquarters of the Israeli army’s Northern Command in the city of Safed on January 6 and 9. respectively.
In his report, the chief military correspondent for the newspaper UNA, Jeremy Pope, asked about the importance of these attacks from a tactical and strategic perspective? Did you help Hezbollah turn the equation against Israel by changing its approach? Has it led the Israeli army to where it claims that its efforts to persuade the party to withdraw its forces from the border are making progress? Is the level of damage caused by the attacks qualitatively different and new?
Tactically, Pope says that the Air Force facility had previously been attacked by Hezbollah, and was close to the border where it should have been prepared to face the threat of an anti-tank missile attack, but was prepared to respond to missile attacks.
Iron Dome
He adds that in that region, the Iron Dome system and other air defense capabilities provide the necessary cover, but they only shoot down missiles that are launched at higher altitudes and on a curved path.
Anti-tank shells fly low and in a straight line towards the target, which are usually heavy armored vehicles, but they can easily destroy a house.
Bob goes on to say that the Israeli army has a Trophy defense system to intercept such threats. This system is an active defense system designed to protect personnel carriers and tanks from direct anti-armor weapons directed in the form of hemispherical protection. However, the army did not deploy defensive systems in larger areas, such as a military base.
All of these factors have a negative impact on the capabilities of the Israeli army and its intelligence monitoring capabilities, as stated in the Jerusalem Post article.
However, the newspaper has learned that the Israeli army has a surplus of surveillance operators, mobile surveillance resources, and fighters who conduct information gathering operations.
According to the newspaper, the F-35 stealth fighter can be used when needed on any front, whether from a long or close distance.
Jeremy Pope says in his report that the Israeli army did not reveal statistics related to the military drones it used in the current war, which has extended for more than 100 days so far. During the period from May 9 to May 13, these aircraft recorded 4,000 hours of flight over the Strip. Gaza in operations against the “Islamic Jihad Movement”.
Tactical capabilities and strategic matters
He goes on to say that despite the Israeli army’s ability to organize tactically, strategic matters remain significant. The army does not have the ability to respond except to launch a pre-emptive attack to prevent anti-tank missiles from hitting military or civilian facilities that are within the 8-kilometre range of Hezbollah’s anti-tank missiles. The speed of the missile is about 500 feet per second, which prevents it from being detected and responded to.
According to Pope’s claim, there is no doubt that Hezbollah has withdrawn many of its forces from the border, and that about 180 fighters from the party and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) have been killed in Lebanon compared to about 20 soldiers from the Israeli army so far.
But until the Israeli army figures out how to deal with the matter ideally, without waging a general war, it will be difficult for Israel to translate its military superiority into sustainable security gains in the long term, as the military analyst told the newspaper.
