Israeli writer Ben Caspit revealed, in an article in Maariv newspaper, that the former minister in the Israeli war government, Gadi Eisenkot, who withdrew with his colleague from the State Camp party, Benny Gantz, from the war council, had presented a set of demands to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the most important of which was to start attacking the city. Rafah, south of the Gaza Strip, but the latter did not do so out of a desire to prolong the war.
The writer referred to the secret document leaked by Israeli Channel 12 journalist Yron Abraham last February, which included Eisenkot’s vision of the course of the war after the seventh of last October, and highlighted what he said were previously never revealed items from this document. Which indicates the depth of the dispute between him and Netanyahu.
The disclosure of the document at that time caused an uproar in Israel because it was issued by a former chief of staff of the occupation army, in addition to his popularity and sympathy following the killing of his son on December 7, when Palestinian resistance fighters detonated a booby-trapped tunnel in an Israeli force on the outskirts of Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip.
Starting with Rafah and the central camps
The writer said that the basic content of the document, which is one of eight documents presented by Eisenkot, was that “the Netanyahu government and the war council are not making the strategic decisions necessary to manage the war and reach achievements,” noting that Eisenkot did not talk about absolute victory, realizing the impossibility of that in the future. Short-term.
The writer said that Eisenkot is aware of the time required to achieve a significant achievement, and knows from the first moment that Netanyahu created an imaginary goal, which is “absolute victory,” and after that he invented another goal, “an even more stupid one called Rafah,” as he put it.
He pointed out that the unpublished parts of the document confirmed that Eisenkot and Gantz believe that “military pressure must be intensified and clashes must be sought in Rafah and in the central camps as well. This document was written on February 15. Despite this request, Netanyahu continued to drag his feet for his own reasons, “Perhaps because he wanted to extend the war indefinitely.”
Whatever the case, Eisenkot states in the document that “the decisions that must be taken are not taken, so the Israeli army remains stagnant, achievements are wasted, and the state loses strategic ammunition and historical opportunities.”
The Israeli writer revealed that the document reveals that Eisenkot called for 5 decisive positions since the beginning of the war, and they are according to the following timings in the year 2023:
- 7/10 Declaration of war.
- 11/10 The decision is for the primary effort in the south and the secondary effort in the north.
- 28/10 Going out for maneuver (ground war).
- 11/24 Entry into the process of returning kidnapped persons (comprehensive exchange deal).
- 1/12 The decision to continue the maneuver.
Ben Caspit confirmed that the Eisenkot document, which was presented to the War Council more than 4 months ago, included a number of steps that were supposed to correct the previous plan, which are:
- Exhausting the Khan Yunis move and intensifying the battle in Rafah and maneuvering in the central camps.
- Starting a trend to return the “kidnapped” until Ramadan (a comprehensive deal).
- Reaching an initial humanitarian solution without the Hamas movement, in which international and Arab parties participate, and with the help of civilian elements in Gaza from outside Hamas.
- Progress towards a settlement in Lebanon, by removing Hezbollah from the border, strengthening the role of UNIFIL forces, deploying the Lebanese army, imposing an arms embargo on Lebanon, and preventing the deterioration of the situation on the northern front before reaching a settlement.
- Taking immediate steps to calm the situation in the West Bank and Jerusalem based on the desire to prevent Hamas from achieving its goals there.
Netanyahu maneuvers and fails
The writer said that after 4 months of this document, the War Council had not taken most of what was stated in it, pointing out that the Israeli military operations in Rafah and in the central camps were long delayed, and their feasibility was exaggerated.
The writer saw that Netanyahu did not show a willingness to take a decision on the American proposal, which the writer believes is a strategic step that would contribute to improving the security situation in Israel in the coming years.
He also saw that Netanyahu is not ready to talk about the “day after” the war, nor does he recognize the importance of the Palestinian Authority, nor does he seek to take steps to relieve pressure on it.
The writer expected that Netanyahu would try to offer the Ministry of War to Gideon Sa’ar, noting that he had withdrawn from the emergency government and founded a party independent of the camp party to which he belonged.
He also expected that Sa’ar would reject Netanyahu’s offer, indicating that he “will not return to a government he just left without real guarantees,” and expressed his belief that Netanyahu, in his current situation, is no longer able to provide Sa’ar with temptations that would convince him to return to the government.
Ben Caspit concluded his article by saying that Netanyahu will wake up after the dust of Gantz and Eisenkot’s withdrawal settles, and find himself surrounded by the extremists he gathered around him in his government, who see no solution other than the option of a destructive war, and who are dragging Israel to become a pariah state.