Occupied Jerusalem- After the aggression against Gaza entered its third month, the Israeli army reserve forces are complaining of a lack of equipment, with a shortage of clothes, shoes and meals, which was evident from the first day of declaring a state of emergency and war with the start of the Battle of Al-Aqsa Flood on the seventh of last October.
Since the start of the aggression on Gaza, 360,000 soldiers from the reserve forces have been called up, and more than 300,000 of them have complied for service. They constitute about 8% of the total number of workers in the economy and the labor market, which includes about 4 million workers and employees, according to data issued by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. .
In an indication that reflects the army’s lack of readiness to provide the reserve forces with basic equipment and supplies for the fighters, initiatives were launched by international Jewish associations and local Israeli movements to donate to purchase supplies and equipment for the soldiers. These campaigns were initially considered initiatives for unity and cohesion among the Israelis.
But these campaigns revealed the extent of the shortage of basic supplies for reserve forces, a reality that these forces from various units are still suffering and facing 74 days after the war.
Testimonies from reserve soldiers – documented by Israeli media – showed the continuing shortage of equipment, meals, and sleeping places, and the overcrowding of the rooms prepared for them.
Miserable conditions
The official Israeli television, Kan-11, revealed the living conditions of reserve forces and the shortage of supplies and equipment needed in their daily lives.
According to testimonies documented by Israeli TV correspondent Han Biar, from reserve soldiers serving in a position on the northern front with Lebanon, the reporter says, “A disturbing picture has been revealed about the poor living conditions experienced by reserve soldiers on the northern front,” and he adds, “We are talking about things that we did not expect to hear.” This period of war.
The Israeli correspondent says, “Instead of providing relief for the reserve forces, the soldiers found themselves living in difficult and miserable conditions, especially with regard to everything related to their basic affairs and needs.”
Some of them were quoted as saying, “The situation is unbearable. Hundreds of reserve soldiers are being thrown into a place that barely accommodates a quarter of the number. Because of these miserable conditions of the place, this week the matter came to a dispute between two officers, and they were on the verge of a fist fight.”
The soldiers attributed the quarrel between the two officers to the fact that each of them wanted to be concerned with managing the affairs of the soldiers under his command, and with a reasonable place to sleep, saying, “There are some soldiers who sleep in vehicles, some of them have rented rooms in nearby political complexes, and they travel in their vehicles back and forth to the place of reserve service.” .
Regarding the place where the reserve soldiers eat their meals, it is evident from the testimonies that “there is a small dining hall, which is like a dining room, so the soldiers eat and eat their food alternately. Each soldier has an allotted time of between 5 and 7 minutes, so they rush to finish the food, in order for everyone to eat.” Their food during the allotted time.”
Donor aid
When Israeli Eran was recruited as a reserve, into a combat unit on the northern front with Lebanon, he did not expect that one of the obstacles he would face would be from within the army. “The feeling is that we are waging a war against Hezbollah, against the weather, and against the army because of the lack of equipment and supplies,” he said in his testimony to Globes.
Eran adds, “The problems of lack of equipment and logistical services affect the ability to fight… and the problems faced by reserve soldiers range from maintenance, sanitation, and lack of protective equipment and means of fighting.”
Regarding attempts to meet their needs, Eran says, “In a company consisting of 100 to 120 soldiers, if you have 50 to 60 suits to protect against the cold, you are in good condition. The most painful thing now is winter equipment. If you do not bring the equipment from home, it is likely that you will not You get nothing from the army.”
He added, “There is a shortage of night vision equipment, and in the first three weeks there were no batteries, then the available means became unusable. We ask donors and benefactors for any military equipment they have..”
Attempts to fill the deficiency
“The conditions Eran describes are heard repeatedly in many conversations with reservists,” says Globes correspondent Assaf Zgrezak, “and volunteers are trying to fill the shortage with tents, stoves, sleeping bags, underwear, down suits, uniforms, tactical helmets and life-saving equipment.” The Army The Israeli does not provide or give all these things to the soldiers.”
Also, “the lack of equipment, and the gap between the soldiers’ expectations and what they found in the army, is not a new issue, as the issue has accompanied operations and wars in recent decades, and one of its most prominent manifestations was in the Second Lebanon War in 2006,” according to Zagrezak, who pointed out that the issue was also addressed in The report of the “Winograd” fact-finding committee, which revealed the severe shortage, and the soldiers’ attempts to purchase equipment and supplies at their own expense.
The correspondent explained that the shortage of equipment appeared again during the military operation on Gaza in 2014, as part of the state comptroller’s report, which also included a reference to the issue of large gaps in the maintenance system in the reserve forces sections.
The observer also revealed a decrease in the number of regular employees in the army to monitor the extent of reserve preparations, in addition to gaps in professional competence in supervising these forces, which prevents their readiness in the event of emergency and war.
Zagrezak adds, “At the end of the fighting, it will be necessary to reconsider the extent of the readiness of the reserve forces, in light of the new security conditions, and to place emergency reserve stores as a priority, to avoid any shortage of even basic supplies for the soldiers, to motivate them to continue fighting and preserve their lives on the battlefield.”
Constant confusion
The matter is not limited to the shortage of military equipment and daily supplies, as the military expert at the Rassam Center for Strategic Studies, Hatem Al-Falahi, believes that the Israeli army suffers from many problems, whether at the level of military leadership in planning or at the strategic level, or at the operational and tactical levels.
Consequently – Al-Falahi says – this matter was reflected in the army’s performance on the battlefield, “so we see that there is very great confusion, and there is an increase in losses.”
He added in a statement to Tel Aviv Tribune Net, “When we talk about the plans that were drawn up by the Zionist army to attack the Gaza Strip, we will find that they were very hasty and did not take sufficient time in the issue of making plans, preparing, preparing and preparing.”
The military expert stated, “The Southern Command, which was responsible for the Gaza Strip, was destroyed on October 7, by the Al-Qassam Command and other resistance factions, and this led to bringing new sectors to the region, which had no knowledge of the land and did not have complete intelligence information that it could use.” In the attack on the Gaza Strip, in addition to this was the desire to take revenge on Gaza, through the use of bombing and destruction, and this was clear.”
Al-Falahi explains, “Military operations are based on analyzing the assessment of the intelligence position and assessing the tactical position. When you have insufficient information about the land and intelligence information, this is reflected in military capabilities.”
Regarding the Israeli forces’ knowledge of the defensive capabilities and capabilities possessed by the resistance factions inside the Gaza Strip, Al-Falahi says, “It is clear that there is a lack of knowledge, and this was greatly reflected in the development of the army’s tactical plan for the fighting, despite the open American support, the airlift, and 10,000 tons of weapons, in addition to support British, French and German, but the Israeli army failed to achieve anything.”
The military expert says, “We can say that there is an incursion, but there is no control, and there is a possibility for the resistance factions to prolong the conflict, so the occupation army went to attack Khan Yunis.”
He added, “There is another main part that has become in the south, and this means fragmentation of the fighting forces, for the sake of what was taken from the sectors (units) towards the north of Gaza and then moved to the south, and this means that it went with sectors that may be less capable or efficient than the north of the sector, which is what… This led to an increase in the number of Israeli army losses on several levels.”