Is the catastrophic Libyan scenario repeated in Sudan? | policy

While Sudan goes on its grinding war, developments appear to be amended to overcome the state of traditional warfare to the most dangerous: an actual partition of the state (Functional Partition).

The announcement of the group (Estabor) of the formation of a parallel government, and the heavy military escalation in the city of Nyala and around Al -Fasher, in conjunction with a meeting that was expected to be canceled for the international quadruple in Washington, putting the Sudanese scene in a decisive way of road It is wanted.

What is happening is not just a rebellion and a war that is imposed between military and political components, but rather a fundamental struggle in the form of the Sudanese state, its political and social borders, and whoever governs it, and who has its sovereign decision.

The increasing indicators of the militia’s intention and the new map it announced to Sudan, indicating its authority in the Darfur region and its surroundings, through civil tools, apparent “a civil alliance”, and its interior “a fait accompli” authority, which threatens a new, more complex and dangerous stage, may enter Sudan in the tunnel of the Libyan long -term model.

Parallel government: legalization of rebellion and legalization of division

In the midst of the comprehensive institutional collapse, the militia forces came out to announce what it called “a civilian alliance”, in an open attempt to create a political cover for controlling western Sudan as a first step to pressure.

This alliance, which was promoted in the media as a secular civil alternative, does not hide the fact that it is a political front of the militia authority that imposes its rule on the ground by force of arms and external cross -border support, especially from the regional sponsor.

It is not an isolated step, but is consistent with a long -term strategy aimed at creating a “actually independent territory”, which is later used as a negotiating card or a starting point for a larger political project.

Hence, the declaration of the parallel government must be read as the first public manifestation of the option of political division in its information, in the context of the war of war and the failure of the rebellion project.

Attractive in Nyala: Control before confession

In parallel with this political movement, the rebellion forces are fighting fierce battles in the city of Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, in an effort to secure its full control of the western region.

Fenala is not an ordinary city. Rather, it is the center of the administrative and military gravity in Darfur, and any control over it is an indirect declaration of an “alternative regional authority”.

The escalation here goes beyond the military targets to deep political targets: imposing a new reality by force before any international settlement begins, and made the militia in a stronger negotiating position, if not parallel to the internationally recognized government in the country, which Port Sudan takes a temporary capital and is conducting arrangements for returning to Khartoum.

Washington and Raba: Do you realize the moment?

In light of these dangerous field developments, attention continued to go to the international Quartet meeting in Washington at the end of July, but was postponed. The move comes after the failure of the Jeddah Massari, Edis Ababa, the entirety of previous attempts in Geneva, Cairo, and London in achieving a real penetration.

But the urgent question: Can any such meeting go beyond the stage of “managing the crisis” to “solving the crisis”? Or is it just a new station in the series of tactics, data and recommendations that do not change anything in reality?

The worrying is that the Quartet, led by the United States, has not yet shown a strong will to curb the support of the clear regional sponsor of the rebellion, nor to practice actual pressure to stop the war and dismantle parallel political platforms.

It seems that international actors are satisfied with late reactions on the events that preceded them in the runs, which enhances the impression that Sudan is left for its fate and its ability to duplicate intentional standards in the peace deals taking place in the region, and mix papers and ambitions.

Between Khartoum and Tripoli: Are we facing a Sudanese version of Libya?

In light of the above, the comparison with Libya itself imposes itself strongly. After the fall of Gaddafi, Libya witnessed a sharp division between two powers, one in the west and the second in the east, supported by different external forces.

Today, it is intended from the announcement that Sudan will follow in similar steps, with some similarities and difference.

In terms of similarities:

• Both countries are witnessing two competing powers: one that has full international legitimacy, and another seeking to impose its authority with the fait accompli.
• Both suffer from contradictory external interventions, supporting conflicting parties and increasing the complexity of the scene.
• The collapse of state institutions, the widespread economy of the war, and the conflict turned into a chronic situation, all of which are common denominators between the two models.

But Sudan is characterized by factors that increase the complexity of its situation, and make the risk of slipping more severe by the virtue of continuous targeting:

• Tribal and social structure in Sudan is more interfering and tangled, which makes any attempt to divide long -term bloody conflicts.

• The Sudanese army still enjoys a popular and historical extension and a broader bond than its Libyan counterpart after the revolution, which remains on the possibility of unity of the state. If this weight and its ability to complete victory and defeat the rebellion are improved.
• The geographical neighborhood of Sudan is more fragile, with open borders with seven countries, which complicates the security scene and seduces regional powers to intervene or benefit from the state of fragility and emptiness.

These characteristics make the Sudanese experience nominated to be a more chaotic and complicated version of the Libyan situation, if the state is not firmly entered to stop this path, which aims to re -narrative (party) and the legitimacy of the scene in order to open the mechanism of re -establishment to the ruling chairs.

And the international pressure that is intensifying, whether it is contacted by the Human Rights Council of the Human Rights Council, or Washington’s canceled, or criminal meetings, are all episodes for one goal, I want it to coincide with the militia announcement (for its virtual government).

The opportunity is narrowing … and the disaster is approaching

Sudan today is going through a stage that is the most dangerous in its modern history, not only because of the severity of the war, but because the features of the state itself are at stake.

The intention behind it is that regional and international forces move quickly towards a comprehensive peaceful settlement that is intended to be imposed to end the war and rebuild the state on civil and democratic foundations in the form of a (new framework) agreement, or that external pressure continues and leave Sudan to slip into the abyss of division and fragmentation, as happened in Libya, and perhaps more bloody and complex to the contrast of the conditions between the two countries.

The formation of two governments, or so thus threw the step, turns the capital into a disaster city, and the absence of any clear horizon of peace despite the completion of the new civil staff from Port Sudan, all indications that the time is no longer in the interest of gradual solutions or political maneuvers, and the forces of influential in the region stand behind the plan in the context of alternative plans after the rebellion failed to achieve the goals of the war.

Every day passes without reaching the national settlement with an internal will seeking the forces assigned to the army, Sudan brings another step to the model of a failed multi -headed state that its opponents seek to embody, and it is intended to be without a center or a future, or the continuation of fragility, division and sustainability of war. Is it considered?