Iran is preparing for a fateful battle policy


The “12 -day war” was a deep structural shock for decision makers, experts, and even Iranian public opinion as well; It revealed the reservoirs of strength and weakness in the military, security, political, and economic structures of the Islamic Republic, in the face of “existential threats.”

With a temporary decline in the flames, the political authority in Iran chose to conduct structural and personal reforms in the higher institutions concerned with decision -making, leadership and implementation, based on “new circumstances” and “imminent threats”.

In a clearer phrase, the ruling elite in Tehran realized the inefficiency of the existing formation, with all its institutions and people, rapidly sought to diagnose the points of damage and take change steps aimed at facing the next wave of a possible attack by Israel or the United States.

The importance of this path stems from the fact that a large number of Iranian military leaders and nuclear scientists were killed during the “bloody wedding” and “Narina” operations.

The statement with the seven articles issued by the leader of the Islamic Revolution on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the “12 -day war” victims formed the first strong official sign of this trend; Where he directed him to the groups of the people, the military establishment, the scientific elites, the heads of platforms and writers, the executive authority, the class of scholars, and the youth.

Based on this, this article seeks to shed light on some of the features of the ongoing transformations in the military, security and political arenas in Iran.

First: the rise of new faces in the military leadership

The use of the Zionist entity formed the “sudden” element in the “12 -day” war, a decisive factor in killing a number of prominent military leaders in the early hours of the confrontation.

According to the initial estimates offered by the Iranian security services and international relations experts, the Israeli terrorist operation relied on a mixture of “satellite monitoring”, “eavesdropping”, “human breakthroughs” and “analyzes based on artificial intelligence”.

Interestingly, the Israeli Mossad apparatus, before the June 13 attack, communicated with more than a hundred leaders and high -level figures in Iran, and threatened them with leaking information about their places of residence and members of their families, but that attempt did not achieve its goals.

This was confirmed by Ali Larijani, adviser to the leader of the revolution and the most prominent candidates to assume the Secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council, during a television interview.

In the “bloody wedding” ambush, a number of senior Iranian military commanders were killed, including: Muhammad Baqri, head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Hussein Salami, commander of the Revolutionary Guards, and Ghulam Ali Rashid, commander of the headquarters of the Seal of the Prophets (concerned with planning and implementing defense projects), and Amir Ali Haji Zadeh, commander of the Gawdhi Revolutionary Guard.

According to the Israeli Channel 12, a meeting of the senior leaders of the revolutionary force of the Revolutionary Guards was held in one of the underground shelters in the early hours of the war, which was subjected to accurate shelling, killing most of the attendees.

After this tragedy, Ayatollah Khamenei, as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, issued a series of new appointments; Abdul Rahim Moussaoui, Ali Sadani, Muhammad Bakbour, Amir Hatami, and Majeed Mousavi were appointed to the positions of the General Command of the Staff, the headquarters of the Seal of the Prophets, the Revolutionary Guards, the army, and the erectional force of the Revolutionary Guards, respectively.

However, Ali Sadani was killed a few days after his appointment, by special forces of the Zionist entity.

Second: The Supreme Defense Council

On May 10, 1980, and after the “Eagle Creative” operation (the failed American attack on the Tabs Desert), the Supreme Defense Council was officially established. Forty -five years later, and based on what the Iranian constitution stipulated in Article 176, speculation about the revival of this council has increased again.

According to the media, the presidency of the council will be taken by Iranian President Masoud Bouchashian, and will include in his membership the Speaker of the Shura Council, the head of the judiciary, representatives of the revolutionary leader in the Supreme Council of National Security, the Minister of Intelligence, the Chief of Staff, the leaders of the Army and the Revolutionary Guards, and the commander of the headquarters of the Seal of the Prophets.

“Nour News”, which is close to Ali Shamkhani, former Secretary -General of the Supreme Council of National Security, considered that the establishment of this council comes “in response to complex threats and special circumstances in the region”, with the aim of enhancing focus and coordination in the country’s defense policy.

However, the most prominent challenge facing this new entity is its structural and organizational relationship with the Supreme Council of National Security. Some Iranian elites are concerned about the possibility of complexity of decision -making and the absence of coordination, due to the overlap in tasks and specializations, and even the possibility of conflicts in decisions.

To confront this challenge, Tehran decided to consider the Supreme Defense Council as a sub -part of the Supreme Council of National Security, to be presented first to the Supreme Council of National Security, then to the leader of the Islamic Revolution for the final approval.

Third: The return of Larijani

After the Constitution Maintenance Council refused, the rehabilitation of Ali Larijani, the former president of the Islamic Shura Council, to run in the presidential elections, some of his political opponents considered that the star of this “moderate fundamentalist” face has escaped, and that he came out of the authority equation in the Islamic Republic.

However, the resumption of indirect negotiations between Tehran and Washington, under the auspices of the Sultanate of Oman, and then the outbreak of the “12 -day” war, paved the way for Larijani’s return to the fore, this time as “the vote of the regime.”

Fifty days after the direct military confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv, expectations are increasing by taking over the position of Secretary -General of the Supreme Council of National Security.

And if it is appointed, this will represent a clear indication of the “special confidence” that Larijani’s personality has the regime, as well as the desire of the Islamic Republic to improve its performance in managing the potential conflict with the Zionist entity.

The assumption of a personality like Larijani, with a prominent record in managing sensitive files such as the “nuclear agreement” and “the strategic cooperation agreement with China”, may reflect a mixture of diplomacy and pragmatic experience that Tehran seeks to harness in the next stage.

Prepare for a fateful battle

New appointments and structural reforms, both military and political, show that the Islamic Republic is preparing to prepare for more effective and efficient confrontation in front of the region’s transformations.

The formation of the Supreme Defense Council, and the return of Larijani as the most fortunate candidate to take over the Secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council, after 670 days on the seventh of October 2023, indicate a shift in the pattern of government inside Iran, and to prevail in the military-security vision in the face of the expansionist tendency of the Zionist entity.

In light of these transformations, the traditional Tehran allies, such as China and Russia, seem more optimistic about the possibility of playing decisive roles in the future of West Asia, and that the Arab Gulf states may find a greater margin of movement to control tension between Tehran and Washington, and try to curb the extremist right -wing government in Israel led by Netanyahu.

The opinions in the article do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al -Jazeera.



Source link

Related posts

The exacerbation of famine doubles the suffering of a Ghazi family, so what is its story? | news

What does the Gaza Strip need to overcome starvation? | policy

Netanyahu Trump calls and talks about a “quick operation” in Gaza news