Occupied Jerusalem- The Israeli army failed to uncover the attack tunnels dug by the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) towards the “Gaza envelope” settlements as part of preparations for the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle.
This is in addition to the intelligence failure to warn and prevent the sudden attack by the Qassam Brigades on the “Gulf” and Israeli towns in the south on the 7th of last October.
On December 17, the occupation army announced the discovery of a tunnel in the northern Gaza Strip, 4 kilometers long, opposite the settlements of the cover, and promoted it as an achievement even though its discovery came about 60 days after a ground incursion by Israeli forces into the region.
The features of the “tunnel failure” were revealed through an investigation published by the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper on Sunday, prepared by investigative journalist and specialist in military and intelligence affairs, Ronen Bergman. They crystallized when the Qassam Brigades announced that the talk was about an attack tunnel that had been prepared and used in the Battle of the “Al-Aqsa Flood.”
“tunnel pasta”
Under the title “The red lights did not turn on, Israel discovered the spaghetti tunnels too late,” Bergman reviewed the failure to uncover the attack tunnels towards the “Gaza envelope,” which Hamas continued to dig in March 2023, as part of preparations for the surprise attack, without the various security services discovering it. Israeli excavations.
There was another mistake added to the series of failures and it will inevitably be put on the table of the investigation committee. The newspaper says, “They believed in Israel that Hamas could not cross the underground fence, yet it continued to dig until March of this year and in preparation for the surprise attack. The army was not prepared.” Enough to uncover and destroy tunnels.”
She adds, “The secret path (the tunnel network), or as some experts in the Israeli army call it, ‘Hamas pasta,’ which plays a major role in the events in Gaza, the Israeli army aspires to dismantle it, or at least, a large part of it in a short time.”
On the other hand, he added, “Because of the ambition of Hamas and its leader Yahya Sinwar to remain there on the fourth floor underground for a long period of time, the (Israeli) kidnappers are imprisoned in a situation that makes it difficult for the army to carry out any military operation to reach them, and for fear of targeting the soldiers from inside the tunnels.”
One of those familiar with the course of the war in Gaza recently suggested, in a meeting of senior officers in the Israeli army, to stop talking about the war above and below the ground, because “it is clear that our enemy is underneath it and this is the location of the campaign, and any attempt to say that we won and took control above the ground does not truly reflect the situation.” According to what was reported by Yedioth Ahronoth.
When the occupation army began the ground campaign on October 27, there were two estimates by most Israeli security services: the first was that Hamas had between 100 and 200 kilometers of tunnels under Gaza, and the second was that as of the end of 2020, it had not had any tunnels. An attack towards the Israeli settlements in the “Gaza envelope”.
Failure of estimates
According to the newspaper, Israeli estimates regarding the tunnel network were emptied of their content, noting that in the first days of the war on Gaza, what Hamas planned to do in a tunnel near the Beit Hanoun “Erez” crossing was discovered, which journalists were called upon to document before it was blown up.
Bergman says, “Maybe they did not know in Israel that Hamas possesses a machine that enables rapid digging with a diameter that allows travel in a large commercial car with it. This reminded me a little of the machines in which part of the railway tunnels are built, as the plan was to continue the tunnel leading to Israel, and one day Propelling vehicles loaded with fighters from the elite forces.”
The Israeli journalist adds, “This did not happen thanks to the underground fence that closed the path of this attack tunnel, and perhaps other tunnels, but rather due to the fact that since 2020, Hamas has not used any tunnels to penetrate Israeli territory.”
He continues, “It is assumed that if such a tunnel had existed, the movement would have used it on October 7, and it would have been a successful operational, engineering and technological achievement that achieved its goals, albeit at a very high cost.”
Regarding the first Israeli estimate regarding the length of the tunnel network, the newspaper’s investigation revealed that it “was not successful,” and the Israeli army estimates – today – that Hamas has between 500 and 600 kilometers of tunnels under Gaza.
The failure to evaluate the tunnel network was not only in terms of length, but also in terms of width, depth, strength of the fortifications, and the amount of fuel, food, and water reserves stored in them, and thus the length of time that Hamas militants could spend in them, according to the same investigation.
Fuzzy plan
It is also inferred from the investigation that in Israel, they did not know the large number of side doors that were designed to stop any attempt to blow up the tunnels, the extent of their winding lines and the sudden changes in directions in their path.
The Israeli journalist attributed the way the tunnels were designed to Hamas’s drilling experts coming to the conclusion that these windings and sudden changes in them would make it difficult for the Israeli army to discover and destroy them.
He explained that Israel knew about the Hamas tunnel project, but in reality, Bergman says, “the information was not sufficient, and its ability to find solutions to the complex issue based on this little information was weak.”
Bergman refers to what was recently reported in the American media about “the Israeli army launching a pilot project to flood the tunnels with water to neutralize them.” But he wonders: Will the army be able, during the remaining time of the third phase of the incursion, to do so and deepen operational control by preventing Hamas from ruling and controlling the Gaza Strip?
He added that the Israeli army acknowledged how difficult it was to blow up and discover the tunnels without exposing its soldiers to danger, and to ensure their destruction without collapsing entire residential neighborhoods, which indicates that the security establishment neglected the tunnel network in Gaza and it seemed as if the problem had been solved, as soon as the ground fence was closed in the face of the attack tunnels leading to it. To Israel.
At this stage, the Israeli army plans to develop an action plan for up to two years to “dismantle the tunnels,” and Bergman says, “But the plan was formulated in a vague and ambiguous way, especially with everything related to deepening Israeli control in the Strip, which will not be achieved due to the battles and international pressures, which will push “The army will withdraw to the security fence, and thus the plan will not be accomplished.”
