How does Israel envision post-Hamas Gaza?

On October 7, Hamas militants shocked Israel and the entire world by carrying out an act of terrorism so deadly that it can be considered the worst act of violence against Jews since the Holocaust.

The scale of the violence, which resulted in the taking of more than 240 hostages and the killing of approximately 1,200 civilians, provoked an Israeli military response greater than Hamas officials could have anticipated. , thus revealing the seriousness of the strategic error committed by the extremist group.

Although the Hamas government in Gaza was never Israel’s preference, it was considered by many to be the best of the “bad” options available.

The events of October 7 completely changed this strategic calculationwith Israel, the United States and many European allies now agreeing that Hamas’s continued rule in Gaza is untenable in the long term, both for Israel and the region as a whole.

Following the October 7 attack, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued a statement saying:Hamas has unleashed a brutal and evil war…What happened today is unprecedented in Israel, and I will make sure it never happens again“.

Will the status quo, maintained since 2006, change once and for all?

This attack is in line with the tensions and conflicts between Israel and Hamaswhich traditionally exacerbate several times a year for various reasons.

The latest skirmish was Operation Shield and Arrow in May, during which Israel assassinated three high-ranking Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants, prompting rocket attacks from Gaza and Israeli retaliation. limited and targeted. These exchanges concluded with an agreement whose basis was the maintenance of Hamas in power.

The Netanyahu government now feels obliged to emphasize that it is unacceptable for Hamas extremists to remain in power in Gaza. This situation, a status quo since 2006, must now change once and for all.

In 2005, Israel withdrew from Gaza, relocating 8,000 Israeli citizens who resided there in 21 settlements. The remaining 3,000 Israeli troops were gradually withdrawn after the expulsion of the settlers. The Israeli disengagement left Fatah in control of the Gaza Strip, under the leadership of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei.

In 2006, however, Hamas came to power in the latest Palestinian electionswhich saw him violently take full control of the Gaza Strip from the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Small-scale conflicts and Israel’s de facto acceptance of Hamas’s control of Gaza suggested the existence of a balance; the Israeli army remained in retreat, and Hamas did not commit atrocities on a scale comparable to the October 7 attack.

This precarious balance was broken by Hamas’s strategic miscalculationa decision that ended Israeli and international acquiescence in Hamas’ rule and could well result in the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza in one form or another.

Meanwhile, Iran and its proxies have left Hamas abandoned

One of Hamas’ main mistakes was to rely on support from Iran and particularly its regional proxies, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen.

While the first days of the war were marked by a large question mark over the support Hamas could expect, the scale of Israel’s reaction, as well as the firm and pragmatic response from Washington and European allies , have clearly shown that, despite possible assurances to the contrary, Iran had no intention of endangering its precious military intervention forces.

Immediately after the attacks, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ordered a strike group led by the USS Gerald R Ford, the world’s largest aircraft carrier, to the Mediterranean to deter attacks. Iran to undertake opportunistic actions.

Despite this, Hezbollah saw itself obliged to actr, which led to missile attacks towards northern Israel, and even attempts at infiltration by air.

Lebanon’s response, however, was very clearly considered. Despite the hundreds of thousands of missiles Hezbollah reportedly held on Israel’s northern border, the scope of each individual attack or response was small enough not to draw Israel into a full-blown conflict.

Make no mistake. Hezbollah’s decision not to open an additional front on Israel’s northern border is not a coincidence and is certainly not the result of restraint.

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Had it wanted, Tehran could have easily made the situation worse with the help of the proxies it has carefully reconstituted since Lebanon’s second war with Israel in 2006.

It is rather the understanding of the room for maneuver granted to Israel by the international community, and in particular by the United States – which finds itself in the middle of an electoral period and is therefore more attentive to decisions which could be perceived as not being not “pro-Israeli” – which led the powers that be to make another decision.

It is now clear to all parties concerned that the status quo in force since 2006 cannot continue.

The proposed solutions are at best optimistic, at worst naive

If the recent ceasefire negotiated by Qatar, which saw the release of Israeli civilians detained by Hamas in exchange for Palestinian security prisoners, had allowed a certain optimism about an imminent end to the war, it is now obvious that it is far from over. Tellingly, the discussion has already turned to the question of post-Hamas Gaza.

Some have suggested a transition period during which Gaza would be in the hands of an international body led by the United Nations, while it rebuilds its infrastructure and public services after fifteen years of neglect by Hamas, before control of Gaza returns to the Palestinian Authority.

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This idea is unrealistic for many reasons, the main one being the impossibility of counting on the United Nations to guarantee the stability of the security situationespecially when we consider how Hezbollah has managed to expand in Lebanon under the watchful eye of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Others argue that this post-Hamas scenario offers Israel and the Palestinian Authority an opportunity to return to the negotiating table andconsider a potential peace agreement, or even a return to the two-state solution.

This view is shared in Israel by politicians such as opposition leader Yair Lapid, who said that “Ultimately, the best thing to do is for the Palestinian Authority to return to Gaza… It’s not ideal, but in my opinion, the best exit strategy from the conflict would be to support the international community to help (the PA take control)“.

The absence of a leader in the ranks of the PA (President Mahmoud Abbas is 88 years old, he is ill and with no apparent successor), combined with the absence of internal legitimacy among the Palestinians themselves, makes this perspective optimistic to say the least.

Benjamin Netanyahu’s future is also uncertain

Aside from the promise to end Hamas’s domination of Gaza, and despite the opportunity presented by Hamas’s gross miscalculation, Benyamin Netanyahu and his government have not yet proposed a coherent vision for post-Hamas Gaza.

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Taken by surprise by the October 7 attack, which saw Israel’s seemingly impenetrable border security easily circumvented, the Netanyahu government can no longer hope to ensure its longevity with the sole promise of “security” to Israeli citizens.

And if he is almost certain that Benjamin Netanyahu will soon be ousted from the Likud leadershiponce the security situation is sufficiently stable to allow a competition for party leadership, it is far from clear that the current Israeli government has any idea of ​​what will happen to it, much less which will follow the inevitable end of Hamas’s rule in the Gaza Strip.

Shlomo Roiter Jesner is president and co-founder of the Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum. He is also CEO of the London-based F&R Strategy Group, a geopolitical consultancy at the intersection of politics and business.

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