9/8/2025–|Last update: 17:41 (Mecca time)
There is no voice that currently rises in Lebanon above the voice of “disarmament of Hezbollah”, which is an issue – and if it comes with American -regional -regional pressures – it is acceptable to internal parties, while the party refuses to recognize it.
On August 5, 2025, the Lebanese Council of Ministers held a session chaired by President Joseph Aoun, the most prominent provisions of its agenda were the file of “inventory of weapons”, in a direct reference to the Hezbollah weapon. The session extended over a period of 5 hours, during which the “Shiite duo” ministers (Hezbollah and the Amal movement) withdrew, but this did not prevent an official decision to “restrict arms” in the hands of the Lebanese state and its security apparatus, with a clear timetable for its implementation.
Two days later, on August 7, the government held a second session in which it approved the goals of the “American paper” to ensure the permanence of the endowment of hostilities with Israel, without going into the details and mechanisms of implementation, pending the army’s report on the executive plan. Once again, the Shiite ministers withdrew, and the Shiite duo considered the decision “non -charter.”
The Al -Jazeera Center for Studies published an analysis entitled “Hezbollah and the weapon: a curvature of the storm and restoration of strengths” by researcher Shafiq Shuqair, which dealt with the description of the position of Hezbollah and its fate after the recent Israeli war on Lebanon, This is by answering 4 basic questions:
- What does the recent Lebanese government decision mean regarding it?
- What is his context?
- And what does Hezbollah want to equalize arms?
- How can he seek to preserve it?
- In addition to the repercussions of this issue on the Lebanese future.
The American paper and the context of the decision
The paper presented by the American envoy Tom Barak aims to consolidate the agreement to stop hostilities concluded on November 27, 2024, based on the Taif Agreement and Security Council Resolution 1701 of 2006. It includes Lebanese obligations to disarm Hezbollah, in exchange for Israeli steps that include withdrawal from 5 border points, stopping land and air violations, demarcating borders, and supporting the capabilities of the Lebanese army.
With the American pressure, and the requirement of Washington the issuance of a Lebanese official decision pledged to disarm Hezbollah to resume its mediation between Beirut and Tel Aviv, the Lebanese government rushed to decide to avoid political and diplomatic isolation, while trying to maintain the path of demanding Israeli obligations through diplomatic channels.
The decision reflects the choice of the Lebanese state to go towards “inventory of weapons”, but with the realization that implementation requires the minimum coordination with Hezbollah, who is still the strongest military actor in the country. The imposition of the decision by force may open the door to security chaos, so the schedule that extends until the end of 2025 came to give time to understanding or to the affected path by regional developments.
Regional dimension
Iran, the main supporter of Hezbollah, still maintains a ability to influence despite the losses it suffered in the last 12 -day war. Tehran seeks to restore its regional influence in parallel with negotiation with Washington on its nuclear file, and if these negotiations lead to positive results, this may be reflected on Hezbollah and its role in Lebanon.
This deadline also provides an additional opportunity for regional forces to influence the Lebanese political scene, especially since some parties expect the upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for May 2026, will form a detailed station to make a change in the balances of Lebanese political forces, and to weaken Hezbollah’s influence within state institutions.
If this possibility is strengthened, the external intervention is likely to increase after this government decision, in an effort to influence the course of the elections and in the position of political forces within the Lebanese regime. In this context, it is not excluded that Israel is targeting the “environment” of Hezbollah in the southern suburbs, south and Bekaa.
What does Hezbollah want?
For its part, Hezbollah categorically rejected the government decision, and expressed this with a calculated political and popular escalation. The party’s Secretary -General Naim Qasim stressed that “the resistance is part of the Taif constitution,” and that the weapon is not discussed by voting. The party also issued a statement in which he described the decision as “not present”, but at the same time it expressed an openness to the dialogue, in reference to its desire to avoid a direct confrontation with the state.
The party also refuses to discuss the American paper, and believes that it exceeds the ceasefire and decision 1701, which – according to its interpretation – only affects its weapon south of Litani, while the north is internal. And he confirms that he committed to what was asked of him in the agreement, while Israel did not withdraw from the five points, and continues violations and assassinations with the drones.
The party’s strategy is based on winning time and postponing any decisive entitlement, taking advantage of regional fragility. The war on Gaza is continuing, the situation in Syria is unstable, and Iran is working to replace it. The party believes that the handover of weapons in the current circumstances may be an entry point for re -drawing the balance of power in the region against it.
In the long run, if the party is forced to deliver its weapon, it is preferable to limit the matter to the heavy and offensive weapon (microscopic missiles, qualitative running aircraft), while maintaining a limited deterrent capacity that ensures that it remains an underlying military force that can be called up if the circumstances change.
The party’s speech in this framework is double:
- After my country: It connects the weapon to defending Lebanon.
- After my identities: It is seen by an existential guarantee of the Shiite community.
Israeli and American position
Israel The moment sees a strategic opportunity to “seize the defeat” of the party, considering that its capabilities have been drained and that its technological superiority is crucial. She rejects any guarantees for Lebanon and insists on disarmament without the principle of “step in exchange for a step.”
US Israel shares the distant goal, but it is more flexible in the means, and it may be satisfied if it is completely unable to disarm the party of the ability to threaten Israel, reduce its political and security influence, and limit its role to a sectarian scope.
Lebanese predicament
Lebanon faces a three -dimensional challenge:
- Achieving security and sovereignty in the south with the disarmament of the party.
- Ensuring Israel’s commitment to a ceasefire and withdrawal.
- Finding a formula to accommodate the party internally without a clash or the loss of Arab support.
Possible scenarios
1- Continuing the current situation:
The party’s weapon remains, and the continued Israeli occupation of the five points, and violations, especially if the American -Iranian dialogue stumbles. This seems likely in the short term.
2- An Israeli escalation:
Imposing full conditions on Lebanon, especially disarmament, if Iran is weak or exposed to a setback.
3- Middle Set:
Reducing the party’s capabilities (makers and missiles) in exchange for security arrangements, with some weapons remaining internally until a comprehensive Lebanese settlement.
This possibility is similar to Lebanon’s traditional crises, and it is likely if Hezbollah recovered, and it is able to withstand external pressures, especially if the United States enters the atmosphere of the midterm congressional elections.
a summary
Hezbollah does not recognize defeat despite its exposure, and confirms its retaining the ability to deter Israel from waging a comprehensive war. He is betting on the steadfastness of its popular incubator and supporting Iran, and works to gradually restore its strength. But he cannot adhere to his weapons in the face of pressure without exposing the country to internal turmoil.
Israel seeks to use the moment to strip him of its weapon, and the United States is working to limit it politically and militarily.
While Lebanon tries to balance external pressures and maintain its internal cohesion.
In the end, the balance of power between the party and Israel, as well as regional understandings, will remain the decisive factor in drawing the fate of Hezbollah, between gradual concessions, or phased settlements, or the continuation of the current situation under the pressure of time.
