Beirut, Lebanon – When Hamas issued a call for recruitment in Lebanon on December 4, several mainstream Lebanese political parties and officials denounced the move, accusing the Palestinian group of violating their country’s national sovereignty, while recalling memories of the bloody civil war. .
But recruiting a parallel armed force could end up serving Hezbollah’s interests, analysts say, due to the Lebanese group’s military hegemony, particularly in southern Lebanon. Hamas reportedly recruits in Lebanon through announcements made in the country’s Palestinian refugee camps and mosques.
“Hezbollah is trying to gain support from Sunni groups (like Hamas in Lebanon) in its fight against Israel from southern Lebanon,” Hilal Khashan, a political science professor at the American University of Beirut, told Tel Aviv Tribune . But no other actor will be able to act independently because “Hezbollah completely controls the situation at the border”.
After Hamas attacks in southern Israel on October 7, which killed 1,200 civilians and soldiers, according to Israeli officials, Israel continued to bombard Gaza, with only a brief pause in the fighting in late November. More than 18,000 people have been killed in Gaza, according to the Health Ministry.
In neighboring Lebanon, more than 100 people have died since Hezbollah first targeted Israel with missiles on October 8. Most of the dead are Hezbollah fighters who have engaged the Israeli army in what they say are efforts to prevent their adversary’s entire forces from descending on Hamas. .
The “Axis of Resistance” in Lebanon
Relations between Hamas and Hezbollah have resumed in recent years after a schism caused by Syria’s civil war. Members of the Hamas leadership left their former base in Damascus in 2012 after condemning Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s brutal suppression of protests.
Starting in 2017, some Hamas members returned to Lebanon, including Saleh al-Arouri, deputy head of the Hamas Political Bureau; Khalil al-Hayya, Hamas’ head of Arab-Islamic relations; and Zaher Jabarin, responsible for issues concerning Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons.
Last year, Hamas leaders revealed the existence of a “joint security room” for the so-called “Axis of Resistance” – an Iranian-affiliated military coalition that includes, among others, other groups, Hamas and Hezbollah. Some analysts believe it could be based in Lebanon. And in April 2023, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh visited Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut.
Analysts say Hamas is unlikely to call for expansion into Lebanon without first consulting Hezbollah.
Hezbollah has maintained its dominance in southern Lebanon for decades. But Israeli officials recently said they could no longer accept the presence of the group, or their elite al-Radwan unit, on Israel’s northern border. This is why Hamas’ growing presence in Lebanon could be a tactical move that would also serve Hezbollah, according to some analysts.
“Hezbollah is looking for local allies in the post-war period because its military component will be challenged as Israel wants to remove it from southern Litani,” Khashan said. After the July 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1701, calling for a demilitarized zone from the Litani River, Lebanon’s longest river which flows from the seaside city of Tire in the south of the Bekaa Valley, as far as is known. like the “Blue Line”, which separates Lebanon from Israel.
But Hamas’s expansion in Lebanon would not only benefit Hezbollah. While Hamas is under siege in Gaza, its popularity in the West Bank has increased, according to a recent opinion poll. In Lebanon, the group could seek to capitalize on its growing popularity and strengthen its political rival, Fatah.
By increasing its numbers in Lebanon, “Hamas can say we have strengthened our political position wherever we exist,” Drew Mikhael, an expert on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, told Tel Aviv Tribune. “No actor or political party wants more power.”
A return to “Fatahland”
However, the announcement caused a stir within certain communities in Lebanon.
“We consider any armed action coming from Lebanese territory as an attack on national sovereignty,” said Gebran Bassil, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, a predominantly Christian party, rejecting the creation of what he called a “Hamas country.” “.
This was a reference to “Fatahland”, a throwback to the days when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Yasser Arafat operated as a state within a state in southern Lebanon. , from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. The PLO used southern Lebanon to launch attacks against Israel and became an active member of Lebanon’s civil war in 1975.
Other condemnations also came from figures such as Lebanon’s interim prime minister, Najib Mikati; the leader of the right-wing nationalist Lebanese Forces party, Samir Geagea; a former police chief and current MP, Ashraf Rifi; and Samy Gemayel, who leads Kataeb, a traditional Christian party that has attempted to rebrand itself in recent years as a center-right nationalist party, among others.
If the warning was issued by politicians of all sectarian stripes, the reference to a return to “Fatahland” was mentioned in particular by several Christian leaders. Resentment against Palestinians over the role of the PLO and other factions in the civil war is still common in Lebanon, particularly among parts of the Christian community, although many sympathize with the current suffering in Gaza.
“Total marginalization of Christians”
With the world’s eyes on Gaza, Lebanon’s Christian leaders could use the announcement to pursue interfaith politics and get a head start on their opponents in Lebanon, analysts say.
“Bassil’s entire career has been an effort to escalate the rhetoric on an ethnonational discourse,” Mikhael said. “Most of the time it’s not aimed at a national audience. It’s an internal struggle with Geagea.”
Bassil and Geagea lead the two largest Christian parties in Lebanon. But despite their stature, both are divisive figures, deeply unpopular outside their immediate support base.
These internal prevarications are indicative of a Christian withdrawal from national politics in Lebanon, according to Michael Young of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut.
“There is total Christian marginalization on most issues today,” Young told Tel Aviv Tribune. “When it comes to issues of national debate, they seem to become more and more parochial. Christians are not really interested in Palestinian politics and are mentally disconnected from the Lebanese state.”