The regional fallout from Israel’s war on Gaza has drawn renewed attention to the so-called “axis of resistance” – a sort of alliance between Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and Syria.
But while Hezbollah and Iran have been visibly active since October 7, the Syrian regime has played a more discreet role in supporting its intermittent ally, Hamas.
The enemy of my enemy
It was only in October last year that Hamas formally reestablished ties with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, more than a decade after they were severed during the early years of the Syrian civil war. , when Hamas joined forces with the Syrian opposition revolution.
Reconciliation was reportedly pushed by Hezbollah and Iran, in part to counter the growing number of Arab governments normalizing relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords.
Framed by Israel’s increasingly tight siege of Gaza since 2007, Hamas was in desperate need of allies. And with the Syrian economy in tatters and Syrian infrastructure increasingly targeted by Israeli air raids, Damascus was unable to maintain its grudge when its main supporters, Iran and Hezbollah, were pushing for the reconciliation.
Syria’s contribution to Hamas’ material strength is small and is unlikely to have played a role in facilitating the October 7 assault.
While Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas’s political wing, told Tel Aviv Tribune last year that part of the group’s long-range rocket arsenal came from Syria, the vast majority of its military stockpiles came from from Iran or were manufactured domestically. However, Syria’s position within the broader alliance with Iran and Hezbollah remains a significant factor in the escalation of violence in the region.
“Syria still plays an important role in the Axis of Resistance, simply because of its geostrategic position,” says Nasrin Akhter, a doctoral student at the University of St Andrews who studies relations between Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria. .
“In addition to serving as a conduit for the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, Syria gives Iran a foothold in the Arab-Israeli arena, allowing it to open a second front against Israel and giving it a base from from which to target the United States. positions in the region. But within this alliance, the Syrian regime is a “passive actor,” says Joseph Daher, academic and expert on Hezbollah and Syria.
“Since 2011, Syria has practically no longer had an autonomous role and depends on either Iran or Russia, sometimes playing against each other,” explains Daher. “Any opening of a military front (against Israel) from Syria will in reality be launched by Hezbollah or pro-Iranian militias”, with Syria itself “unwilling and unable to launch a war against Israel”.
Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah himself admitted: “We cannot ask more from Syria and we must be realistic,” Nasrallah said on November 11 in a speech to his supporters. “Syria has been in the grip of a world war for 12 years. Despite his difficult situation, he supports the resistance and suffers the consequences.”
A battlefield for proxy warfare
Since the start of the war on Gaza, Syria has been the scene of attacks and reprisals between Israel and the United States, on the one hand, and Iran and Iranian-backed militias, on the other. go.
Over the past month, the United States has carried out multiple airstrikes in Syria against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its allies, and Israel has bombed airports in Damascus and Aleppo. Meanwhile, Iranian-backed militias have struck U.S. targets at least 40 times in Iraq and Syria, according to the Pentagon.
The escalation of violence creates even more instability in Syria and “increases the likelihood that Syria will turn into a battlefield for a proxy war waged by regional and global powers, exacerbating further suffering and misery for the Syrian people,” Akhter said.
But while Syrians suffer the consequences of the regime’s alliance with Hamas, Assad himself could benefit politically, as regional leaders face growing popular pressure to change their stance toward Israel.
As the Abraham Accords appear increasingly untenable, the Syrian regime’s normalization with Arab leaders continues apace. In November, al-Assad attended the Arab-Islamic summit hosted by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, alongside regional leaders who had previously denounced him.
But regardless of the regime’s rhetorical support in Gaza or the photo opportunities that accompany regional summits, al-Assad remains a controversial and unpopular figure.
“The key issue (for the Syrian regime) is not the liberation of Palestine, but its own survival and geopolitical interests,” explains Daher.
“Assad’s popularity is already very low in the country due to the continued worsening socio-economic crisis, with more than 90 percent of the population living below the poverty line. There will be no significant increase in his popularity as a result of his support for Hamas. »
Akhter agrees: “It is widely believed in the Arab world that the Syrian regime is simply championing the Palestinian cause for its own political purposes, in order to divert attention from its own domestic human rights violations.
“This will do little to erase the recent memory of atrocities perpetrated by the Syrian regime, with many drawing parallels between the punitive blockade and bombing of Gaza by Israel with the Syrian siege of the Yarmouk refugee camp, which brought the Palestinian population there on the verge of starvation. .”
