The fireball that Israel is rolling in the region is almost igniting the entire region, as it continues to open one front after another in a relentless pursuit of war. It seems that the Al-Aqsa flood was nothing but an excuse that Tel Aviv exploited to extinguish the sparks of these successive battles and begin a pre-planned scenario to achieve gains. Field and regional.
This raises an important and serious question: Are we heading towards a long, comprehensive regional war? Or more accurately: Has this war begun?
Tel Aviv Tribune Center for Studies published a position paper entitled “The Israeli Risk: A Long, Comprehensive Regional War,” which dealt with the Israeli approach to the war on Lebanon, and the defensive approach adopted by Hezbollah in it. It also touched on the Iranian position and the possibilities for its development, as well as the American position on the Israeli strategy, And the expansion of the war in the Middle East, and the shifts in this position related to the elections whose bell is about to ring.
The paper indicated that this round of the Arab-Israeli conflict revealed, since its outbreak, the inability of the Arab-Islamic system to influence the course of the war, whether through direct intervention or through effective action at the international level. It also revealed the limited Russian-Chinese influence in international resolution, especially with regard to With crises far from the immediate neighborhood of these two powers.
The Israeli approach in Lebanon
As for Israel, the voices of the ruling class have risen by calling for heading north and launching a broad campaign against Hezbollah since the first weeks of its adoption of the policy of supporting Gaza. But it is likely that the army leadership saw that the Lebanese front was a heavy burden that was difficult to bear, so it waited until the volume of operations in the Gaza Strip decreased from the end of August 2024, so that the Israeli army moved towards the north and began its operations in southern Lebanon.
In view of what was revealed about the nature of the Israeli operations there, the paper suggests that the aerial bombardment campaign will continue on all centers that the Israelis believe have a relationship with Hezbollah, both military and civilian services, and that the campaigns to displace the Lebanese and target homes, factories and farms in the south, the suburbs and the Bekaa, and attempts to assassinate leaders will continue. The party and its cadres. Ground incursions into the border strip may develop, and targets outside the party’s traditional areas of influence may be bombed, including Lebanese infrastructure that has nothing to do with the party or its incubator. Indeed, the campaign against the party’s positions in Syria may develop into an invasion of the Syrian interior.
As for the party, its defense policy is based on two parts: the first relates to dealing with all attempts at Israeli incursion on land along the border, or by sea along the coast extending from southern Beirut to Ras Naqoura. The second is the gradual escalation in missile bombardment and drone attacks on Israeli targets, whether in terms of the depth or quality of the targets.
In the political field, what raises the party’s concern are the movements that began with the meetings of the parties opposing it in Lebanon, led by the Lebanese Forces led by Samir Geagea. These movements – as it seems – enjoy regional and international support, and aim to re-establish the power equation in the Lebanese arena, by electing a new president of the republic in isolation from the will of the party, moving towards implementing international resolutions 1559 and 1701, putting an end to the war on Lebanon, and then disarming the party and transforming it into To a political group only, and weapons are restricted to the Lebanese army.
As for Iran, although it is not a direct party in the war on Gaza or on the Lebanese front, it is a very influential party, and its relationship with the war may develop from intermittent clashes with Israel (response and counter-response) to a continuous and broader clash.
It was clear from the beginning of the war that Iran – like Hezbollah – did not want to become directly involved in it, but it seems that the pace, size and impact of the expected Israeli response, and then the expected Iranian counter-response, will represent a critical turning point in determining the nature of the Israeli-Iranian confrontation. In the event of a strategic escalation of the confrontation, and responses and counter-responses escaping control, it is not unlikely that Iran will resort to opening the Syrian front and encouraging its allies in Iraq and Yemen, as well as Lebanon, to escalate their attacks on Israel.
Shifts in the American position
The Americans declare that they do not want the war to expand in the Middle East, or at least this is what President Joe Biden and senior officials in his administration repeat, but this administration has refrained since the beginning of the war from exerting any tangible pressure on the Netanyahu government, and has not stopped, even for a moment, from responding to Israel’s weapons needs and demands. As well as its protection in the Security Council and the International Court of Justice.
It is clear that the Biden administration does not oppose Israel’s attempt to undermine Hezbollah’s strength and military capabilities, and weaken its political role in the Lebanese arena, and believes that there are increasing indicators of the weakness of the party and Iran, and that more military pressure could impose a tangible decline on them in Lebanon and the region.
Therefore, the pattern of events indicates that the Netanyahu government is still determined to continue the war on Lebanon, despite the Israeli army’s inability to achieve tangible progress behind the border strip with Lebanon.
However, Hezbollah, despite the painful blows it suffered in September, appears to have regained its balance. Since the beginning of this October, it has demonstrated tangible cohesion on the military level, manifested in solid resistance to the Israeli incursion into the south, and in the ability to launch attacks. Daily with dozens of missiles and drones on military and strategic sites, from the far north of Israel to Haifa and Tel Aviv.
As for the developments in the Israeli-Iranian clash, and what the rounds of response and counter-response might lead to, it is another race that the Lebanese front is awaiting, especially since it is not unlikely that the Israeli leadership will wait until after the American elections to deal a major blow to the Iranian nuclear project.
On the other hand, it seems that Iran has not yet decided on the direction of the confrontation with Israel, between pushing Hezbollah to a quick settlement regardless of the war in Gaza, or encouraging it and its other allies to escalate attacks against Israel, or working to open another front for the war, especially in Syria, closely linked to the Lebanese front, geographically and strategically.
To view the full paper, or download it from here.