Introduction to translation
In an article on “Davis One” for military affairs, the American “Collin Flint”, a professor of geography known as Utah State, wrote, talking about the hidden side of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which many have been busy with what is going on in its sky and on its soil, and they were not busy enough next to its sea, which is the side that witnessed the most prominent Russian weaknesses.
This is not only because of the marine successes achieved by Ukraine at the beginning of the war, but because Russia’s losses in the Black Sea opened the door to a new path in Chinese-Russian relations, making Russia as a naval force capable of reaching the waters far from it around the world, but provided that it is just a “small” partner for China, unlike what was the case at the height of its global strength during the presence of the Soviet Union.
Translation
Away from the arduous land battles and destructive air strikes, the Ukraine war had a clear marine dimension. After the Russian invasion in February 2022 shortly, Russia imposed an actual maritime ban on Ukraine, before the Russians stood up to their fleet while asking a heavy defeat in the battle of controlling the Black Sea.
This watership war appears to be on the way to an agreement announced by the United States on March 25. According to the provisions of the agreement that the two parties reached in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, both Russia and Ukraine agreed to ensure “navigation security in the Black Sea, stop the use of force in its waters, and refrain from using commercial ships for military purposes,” as stated in a statement issued by the White House.
The marine side of the Ukraine war did not get enough attention compared to land and air battles, but it is in fact an important aspect and can have distant repercussions.
The losses of Russia in the Black Sea not only restricted its ability to highlight its power and extend its influence through its naval fleet around the world, and also resulted in increasing cooperation between Russia and China, as Russia appeared as a lower partner home to Beijing in order to exist in the high seas.
Black Sea loss
The geopolitical theory has always disintegrated to the excessive simplification of its perceptions of international politics, as it has ranked common geopolitical theories since the end of the nineteenth century the countries of the world as either ground forces or naval powers. Thinkers, such as the British geopolitan, Sir Halford McKender and American theorist, Al -Farad Mahan, described the naval powers as countries that enjoy democratic liberalism and free trade, in contrast to the wild powers that were portrayed as authoritarian countries and imbued with the military spirit.
Although these generalizations were used throughout the history of the demonization of Britain’s enemies and the United States, there is still a trend of division of the world into ground powers and marine forces, accompanied by the perception of the fact that wild and marine wars are somewhat separate. This division gives us a false impression that Russia is making progress in its war with Ukraine (because of its victories on the ground in eastern Ukraine)*. Although Moscow has already achieved successes on the ground and in the air, this should not make us lose sight of its losing the moccinker in the Black Sea, which witnessed Russia’s retreat from the Ukrainian coast, and keeping its ships away from the lines of fire.
According to Collin Flint in the book “The Water near and far: the political geography of the naval power”, countries that have a naval force have two basic occupants, the first of which is that they must seek to control the relatively nearby seas areas to its coasts, which is what is called “nearby water”, and the second is that if it possesses the desire and the ability to try to highlight its strength and spread its influence after that Al -Baida “through the seas and oceans, which is sometimes” water near “water for other countries.
The Black Sea is almost closed and relatively small, and is formed from the waters of the surrounding countries: Türkiye from the south, Bulgaria and Romania from the west, Georgia from the east, Russia and Ukraine from the north. Control of this nearby water has long been a dispute over the centuries, and it played a role in the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war. Russia’s acquisition of the Crimea in 2014 allowed it to take control of the port of Svasopol, and then what Ukraine considered its “water near” one day, has already become part of the water near Russia after 2014.
Russia withdraws its fleet from Crimea
Crimean control allowed Russia to disrupt the Ukrainian trade with the world, especially the export of grains to the African continent, which is completed through remote international waters. However, Russia’s movements were quickly frustrated as a result of cooperation between Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, as triple cooperation allowed the passage of Ukrainian shipping ships across the water near these countries, and then through the Bosphorus to the Mediterranean Sea.
The use of Bulgarian, Romanian and Turkish territorial waters allowed Ukraine to export about 5.2-5.8 million tons of grains per month before the outbreak of the war, and the number fell to two million in the summer of 2023 due to Russian attacks and threats.
Before announcing the ceasefire, the expectations of the Foreign Agricultural Services Agency of the US Department of Agriculture indicated that the exports of Ukrainian grains for the year 2025 will witness a decrease, but efforts to contain Russian control over the waters of Ukraine in the Black Sea, and Russia’s reluctance to adventure to attack ships in the waters of nearby NATO members (NATO) overlooking the Black Sea (Turkey and Romania And Bulgaria)*, and the dire results that can result from an escalation of this kind; Ukraine allowed the far waters to achieve economic gains and keep its economy alive.
Besides aborting its ability to stop Ukrainian exports, Russia fell under the direct maritime attack by Ukraine. Since February 2022, Kiev has used offensive enlocutors, succeeded in dumping and destroying Russian ships, and reduced the capabilities of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, where 15 of 36 ships were flooded by Russia before the war, and damaged other ships. Russia has been forced to restrict its use of the port of Svasopol, and made its ships anchored to the eastern coast of the Black Sea, and then lost the ability to move effectively in the nearby waters that it succeeded in controlling the Crimea in 2014.
Navy: The Historical Point of Russia
Russia’s naval setbacks in the face of Ukraine are a link in a series of historical difficulties that have long suffered in order to extend its marine power, and what resulted from the constantly of Russia’s tendency to focus mainly on protecting its nearby waters. In 1905, Russia was shocked by a dramatic naval warship against Japan. Even when Moscow has fought wars that it did not lose completely, its marine power remained constantly bound.
In the First World War, Russia cooperated with the British Royal Navy to reduce the German commercial activity in the Baltic Sea, as well as the Turkish (Ottoman) trade and military influence in the Black Sea.
In World War II, Russia relied on material support from its allies as a result of the Nazi naval blockade that confined it to the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, where most Soviet ships were withdrawn to the Russian coast or its defender for the wild war with Germany was re -employed.
During the Cold War, and despite the Soviet Union’s boats that carry fast -moving missiles, and a number of aircraft carriers, its ability to be in remote waters was based mainly on submarines, and the primary goal of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet was to prevent NATO from being entered into the Black Sea.
Now, Russia has lost its full control of the Black Sea, and it is no longer able to move in waters that came up until recently, “its water is close” for it, a loss that reduces its ability to spread its marine power from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. In the face of that clear loss in its background, and the weak position in its nearby waters, Russia can no longer be present on the high seas except in cooperation with China, which is strongly investing in its remote marine capabilities.
Partnership with China .. on the conditions of China
In July 2024, joint naval exercises were held between the two countries in the South China Sea, which clearly embodied Chinese-Russian cooperation. At the time, “Wang Guang Gong”, an officer in the southern forces in the naval of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, stated that “the Chinese-Russian-Russian maneuvers are enhancing the deepening of relations and practical cooperation between the two municipalities in various directions and fields, and raised efficiently from China and Russia’s capabilities to face maritime security threats in a common way.”
This cooperation seems logical from a purely military perspective in Russia, as it is a useful project for both parties in order to extend their influence at sea. However, it is greatly in the interest of China, as Russia can help China protect its nearby water in the north, and to secure Beijing’s arrival to the distant waters in the Northern Frozen Ocean, a region that is increasingly important due to the creatures of climate change from reducing navigation obstacles previously due to ice.
Russia remains a lower partner in this maritime alliance, as its strategic interests will only be met if they were blinded with Chinese interests. In short, the naval force is mainly related to the ability to extend the power to achieve economic benefit, so China will likely use Russia to protect its growing economic influence in African and European waters, South America waters and the Pacific, but it is difficult to expose these interests at risk for Russian goals.
There is no doubt that Russia has economic interests linked to the water far from it, especially in the African Sahel region and sub -Saharan Africa. The insurance of these Russian interests is integrated with the increasing presence of China in the Indian Ocean to protect the broader Chinese and global economic interests. But cooperation is taking place in these spaces with a Chinese desire and approval in the first place.
Over the course of most of the war in Ukraine, Russia’s naval movement was restricted in its nearby waters in the Black Sea, and the only sign of its ability to extend its marine power was its ability to reach distant waters in Africa and the Indian Ocean, which was only made as a small partner of China, which sets its own conditions. Russia’s arrival in a maritime agreement with Ukraine now, even if it is written to continue, will not compensate Russia for its growing inability to highlight its strength and extend its maritime influence on its own around the seas and oceans of the world.
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This article is translated from the “Divins One” website and does not necessarily express Al -Jazeera Net