Dramatic reports, claims and videos have emerged from both sides involved in the fighting in Gaza over the past week.
The week began with the Israeli army releasing several videos of Palestinians naked down to their underwear parading through urban ruins. The Israeli public relations machine ignored the Palestinian outcry that followed. Israel has steadfastly maintained that the men were Hamas fighters and that their alleged mass surrenders meant that the end of the Palestinian group was near, although many Palestinians and independent observers insisted that the men were civilians who had been treated against the laws of war by being publicly humiliated.
For its part, Hamas has stuck to its usual practice of making its case through video broadcasts – cleverly edited to reinforce the desired effects – purporting to confirm its consistent and numerous successes against the Israeli invaders, mainly showing shooting against armored vehicles.
Then came the news that stunned Israel and put a big question mark on its official line that Hamas was on the brink of collapse. First, nine soldiers were killed on Tuesday during a single operation in the Shujaiya neighborhood of Gaza City. This shock was followed by another on Friday, with the Israeli army admitting to killing three Israeli captives, mistaking them for enemies – even though they were waving white flags.
So, what is really happening on the ground in Gaza?
Nothing we predicted weeks ago: the war has entered a difficult, unpredictable and bloody phase of large-scale urban warfare where gains are small and slow, and losses can be enormous.
Fighting in the narrow, cramped streets of old cities is known to be one of the most difficult ways to wage war. Classic military theory is that defended cities are surrounded and blockaded by units just strong enough to prevent the defenders from breaking out, while the main force continues to advance and take territory.
But the fight in Gaza is not about conquering fields and beaches: Israel’s proclaimed objective is to destroy Hamas. To do this, the first step is to control the terrain where the enemy operates: the cities.
Many aspects of war are as old as the human urge to wage war: attack and conquer versus defend and remain free. But the means to achieve these goals have changed with technology and, at times, the means available to soldiers favor one aspect over another.
Once upon a time, cities needed strong walls to defend themselves, but over the past 100 years, weapons have advanced at a rapid pace, leading to a change in tactics. Successful resistance to enemy attacks no longer depends on huge and expensive static strongholds. Nowadays, small but powerful hand-held weapons, whose destructive power is extremely disproportionate to their size, such as anti-tank rocket launchers, grenade launchers, small mortars, assault rifles and many more others, allow defenders to transform every house and every street into a formidable defensive position.
From the 1940s to the present, almost all attempts to conquer cities held by determined defenders have ended in failure. The few victories won by the attackers were so costly that they often ended the offensive capabilities of the armies entering the cities.
In their own ways, Stalingrad, Warsaw, Berlin, Dien Bien Phu, Vukovar, Sarajevo, Grozny and Fallujah – some successfully defended themselves, others ultimately succumbed to attack – all confirmed the military wisdom that urban warfare should be avoided as much as possible.
Israel could not avoid an urban war in Gaza. To have a chance of destroying Hamas, it must deny it its area of ​​operation, the three largest urban centers in the strip: Gaza City, Khan Younis and Rafah.
In the first phase of its ground operation, the Israeli army advanced over open terrain, through farmland and villages that do not lend themselves to major defense, content to harass attacks to slow and curb the invaders . Hamas acted in classic guerrilla fashion, launching a few hit-and-run attacks without wasting any effort to stop the Israelis on the spot.
The second phase began with the arrival of Israeli forces in the suburbs, first of Gaza City and then, after the expiration of the temporary ceasefire, of Khan Younis. Advancing slowly and cautiously while awaiting a concentrated response from Hamas, the Israeli army completed the encirclement of these two urban areas.
It would be naive to assume that Israeli generals hoped that by isolating the two largest built-up areas in the Gaza Strip they would seriously undermine the ability of the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, to fight back.
In reality, the encirclement of the two city centers is not a classic encirclement where the blocked troops cannot be reinforced or receive supplies. Hamas still has an unknown but probably major part of its tunnel network intact and can enter and exit it. They have some difficulty achieving this, but the Hamas fighters are not locked up.
Aware of the threat posed by the tunnels, but also of the serious danger of fighting there, Israel has tried several approaches. He has destroyed as many tunnel entrances as he has found, mostly in areas under his control, but many other entrances keep the danger acute.
After several attempts to send troops underground ended in disaster with the troops falling into Hamas traps, the high command abandoned this approach. He then reportedly considered the idea of ​​filling the tunnels with seawater, saying the flood test was successful, but he has not yet decided to mount a full-scale flood operation.
Israeli actions on the ground this week strongly suggest that Israeli military leaders realize that the only way to achieve their proclaimed goal of annihilating Hamas is to take, hold and control the terrain in the centers. currently surrounded by Gaza City and Khan Younis.
This in itself would not guarantee victory but could create the conditions to trap Hamas fighters in the tunnels, after which Israeli forces could block and destroy all entrances.
Eliminating Hamas would likely require weeks of intense urban warfare, with many more mass casualties – on both sides.
The more Israeli soldiers are killed in the city centers of Gaza, without yet being able to claim the destruction of Hamas, the more support for the continuation of the military operation will diminish. At some point, Israel’s calls to stop the war may become louder than those to continue it.
