The Israeli military’s response to the Hamas attacks on October 7 has so far gone through four distinct phases.
The first, which began a few hours after the incursion into Israeli territory, was mainly an aerial bombardment as revenge and preparation for the next steps. The second phase saw infantry and artillery enter the northern areas of the Gaza Strip from three directions, advancing towards Gaza City to cut it off from the rest of Palestinian territory.
In the third phase, the Israeli army completed the encirclement on the outskirts of the city, making some limited advances and probes towards the center. In the current fourth phase, Israeli soldiers are slowly advancing towards the center of Gaza City, engaging in real urban fighting.
After successfully blockading the largest northern city, Israel repeated the same staged approach in the center, and the fighting in Khan Younis is now also in its fourth phase.
Fighting so far has been limited to conventional ground combat, with both sides acting as analysts predicted. The threat of a tunnel war has not yet materialized.
To confirm my assessment of the fighting so far – especially as I observe it from afar – I spoke to a retired American general with whom I spent time in the field during intense urban fighting in Fallujah, Iraq in 2004. He shared my point of view. of the dangers and difficulties of a large-scale MOUT, the American abbreviation for “military operations in urban terrain” that Israel is carrying out.
He made two very interesting observations about the victims.
First, the learning curve for attackers is very steep, as expected. No amount of training can prepare soldiers for the real conditions of fighting in narrow streets, attacks from all sides, including from above, and tunnels as well.
The general emphasized that “the most effective weapon in urban warfare is experience,” explaining that each munition is designed for a certain imagined and ideal situation that never exists on the ground. “During training, a soldier learns what a hand grenade is supposed to do, for example, and what its lethal range is. But until he throws a few from one room to another, he can’t imagine the force of the explosion or the distance the shrapnel traveled as it bounced off the walls. concrete “. Until every fighter and engaged unit gains this crucial experience, they will suffer higher casualties.
The death of nine Israeli soldiers in a single incident in Shujayea on December 12 is a classic example of the general’s warning. Two officers and two soldiers from the Golani Brigade, one of the Israeli army’s most experienced units, were ambushed by Qassam Brigade fighters as they entered a building. An improvised explosive device (IED) blocked their escape route and Hamas fighters finished them off with hand grenades and machine gun fire. As a second Israeli team attempted to rescue their comrades, they too set off IEDs and were subsequently killed by crossfire from the building they were in and from the upper floors of the neighboring building.
The American general’s second poignant warning concerns the numbers. While in modern wars attackers can expect between three and five casualties for every soldier killed, the ratio in MOUT is probably twice as high.
The extreme dangers of urban combat don’t just affect soldiers. Civilians caught in house-to-house fighting zones are also killed – some by aerial bombs, others by soldiers on the ground.
The Israeli Air Force did not really think about sparing civilian lives when bombing Gaza; Most of the Palestinians killed, now more than 20,000, were victims of aerial bombardments.
Israel admitted that 50 percent of the bombs used were “dumb” bombs. They can only be aimed by aiming the aircraft before launch and can range 50 to 100 meters (164 to 328 ft) from their aiming point. For Israel, it might be acceptable to kill Palestinian civilians through inaccurate bombing, but not Israeli soldiers.
But Israel has already killed one in eight combat casualties thanks to inaccurate bombing. On December 12, the military command admitted that of the 105 soldiers killed at that time – the current figure is 137 – 20 had been killed by “friendly fire” and other incidents involving Israeli soldiers occurred. -killing. Of these 20 soldiers, 13 died due to Israeli Air Force bombs, either due to mistaken identification and location of the troops or due to bombs falling far from the aiming point.
The majority of these bombing casualties occurred in the early stages of the war, when the distances between troops and their enemies were still considerable. But in urban combat, enemies are often 10 or 20 meters (33 to 66 feet) away, so the only acceptable way to support them is with precision-guided smart bombs.
Israel’s current pace of progress appears to be slow. Such a modest pace of movement could be deliberate, in order to minimize casualties. But if the coming days demonstrate a reduction in bombing on the centers of Gaza City and Khan Younis, it could be an early sign that the Israeli Air Force is running out of smart bombs.
Another incident also demonstrated the extreme dangers of urban warfare: On December 15, Israeli soldiers killed three Israeli captives who had managed to escape and were trying to rejoin the very unit that machine-gunned them to death.
Israel was shocked, because the civilians, for a change, were Israeli civilians, not Palestinians who are routinely killed by armed Israeli soldiers and police. But how could soldiers shoot people who didn’t look like soldiers? Bare-chested, to show that they had no weapons; in civilian pants; carrying a makeshift white flag, a symbol of surrender and peace; and speaking in Hebrew?
Under pressure from its stunned citizens, the Israeli military will certainly investigate all the circumstances in detail, but some things are clear.
Even in the heat of battle, killing civilians, especially those who demonstrate intent to surrender, can be a sign of several undesirable problems that undermine the operational performance of any army. These include a lack of appropriate training to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants; blatant disregard for the life of the alleged enemy demonstrating his intention to surrender; and extreme combat stress without psychological support for war-weary soldiers.
Other possible factors include higher command’s failure to comply with battlefield conditions and failure to take units out of action that may have been engaged in heavy combat, particularly if the unit suffered casualties ; and the breakdown of the chain of command or the appointment of commanders unable to follow orders and make decisions.
Besides Hamas, the Israeli army clearly has problems to resolve within its ranks. At the same time, he does not seem sure of being able to count on the support of his Prime Minister. There are signs that many senior officers are wary of Benjamin Netanyahu and would prefer to have in his place someone who would show more respect for the military than for his own political goals.
They won’t admit it, but another ceasefire could be the respite the Israeli military needs.
