Last week, Israeli ground incursions into Gaza can be described as a “war on hospitals.” Most Israeli military activity in recent days appears to be directed at or around medical facilities in Gaza City.
On Wednesday morning, the Israeli army attacked al-Shifa hospital, the largest in the Gaza Strip, after surrounding it for several days, targeting its premises and its immediate surroundings and, according to doctors present at the interior, occasionally firing from snipers. On Tuesday, Gaza’s health ministry said at least 40 people had been killed in hospital.
The Israeli side insists that Hamas’s Qassam Brigades have underground command centers or other facilities located beneath some hospitals in Gaza. Hamas strongly refutes this assertion.
Palestinian and international medical personnel and humanitarian organizations are desperately demanding an end to the attacks and the urgent delivery of medical supplies, water and fuel to hospitals.
In modern warfare, there is usually a neutral agency on the ground that can act as an intermediary between the warring parties. Even enemies must speak, organize local ceasefires to evacuate the dead and wounded, exchange prisoners of war and let civilians out. Talks at higher levels, direct or through intermediaries, often take place in a neutral location away from the battlefield. Qatar and other countries play a key role in hostage negotiations between Israel and Hamas, but there is still a need to communicate on the ground as well.
This task is often undertaken by the International Red Cross or Red Crescent, whose representatives, experienced and generally very discreet, have helped to alleviate much suffering during past conflicts. Yet, despite the presence of several trusted organizations, Israel appears to have made no attempt to have them confirm or deny the existence of such military installations in these unfortunate hospitals.
I have been able to examine commercial satellite images of the area of recent Israeli operations in northern Gaza and, despite their fairly low resolution – which often makes it impossible to accurately identify even the smallest details – they reveal many interesting facts.
They clearly confirm that Israel attacked in three columns. Two of them, of approximately equal strength, each with 200 to 300 vehicles of all types, were advancing along the main axes. One of them drove south from Israel along the coast, covering up to 2 km in width to reach Jabalia. The head of this column has now reached the last open ground before the Shati refugee camp.
The second main column crossed the strip south of Gaza City. When it reached the sea it turned north along the coast and now stopped and dug in just short of the harbour. Elements of this column advanced into the area leading to al-Shifa Hospital and have now entered the medical facility.
The third, smaller column moved from the Erez checkpoint toward Beit Hanoon. Unlike the two main forces whose essential task was to take the ground and eliminate Hamas fighters, this group seems to have had two objectives: to deny Hamas the possibility of flanking the main columns, bypassing them and attacking from the sides, and also to attract fighters to an additional open front. It has reached the first houses in Gaza City proper and is now positioned there.
Analyzing the satellite photos taken over the last five days, there appears to have been very little movement: positioning in the areas taken rather than significant progress.
Most Israeli companies appear to have reached their current positions as of Friday and, with the exception of those involved in the actions around al-Shifa Hospital, now appear to be waiting for the next step. They are dug in and camped in the same manner: armed vehicles with their backs to buildings that have visibly been cleared of their tenants and occupied by the Israeli army, with as much clear space in front of them as possible to deter Hamas incursions.
In addition to these three attack columns, satellites show a large group of vehicles inside Israel, near Nahal Oz, one of the sites of the Hamas attack on October 7.
The fact that this battle group has not moved since its deployment confirms that it constitutes the strategic reserve, a force which remains close to the battlefield, ready to rush out if necessary. Usually, he rushes into battle when a major unit is in difficulty and needs assistance, or when reconnaissance shows a sudden opportunity – an area where enemy defenses are weak for a decisive surprise attack to succeed. .
What about Hamas so far?
Although it is difficult to determine the extent of its fighting and tactics because evidence is scant, a number of released videos show that Palestinian fighters chose tactics that suited the situation on the ground. They avoided fighting in open terrain where they had little chance and tried to conserve their strength for the next phase.
When the Israelis enter the narrow streets of dense urban areas, Hamas soldiers will be able to use the terrain to their advantage, using the damaged and mostly empty tunnels and buildings.
Although they obviously delayed their main attack, Hamas fighters did not just wait. Even in open terrain, often using vegetation cover and agricultural buildings, they took every opportunity to fire their arsenal at the advancing Israelis.
Yet Hamas’s claims regarding the number of Israeli vehicles destroyed appear to be greatly exaggerated. On Saturday, November 11, a spokesperson for the Qassam Brigades said that 160 military vehicles from the two columns advancing from the northern border of Gaza had been destroyed “totally or partially”, including 25 in the 48 hours preceding the announcement.
As often happens with military statements, this is largely a matter of semantics.
Although “vehicle totally destroyed” is self-explanatory, the term “partially destroyed” is vague and contradictory and more suitable for propaganda than factual reporting. The devil is always in the details: it is entirely possible that 160 soft-skinned armored Israeli military vehicles were hit during the ground invasion. The problem is how many of them died after the attacks.
“Destroyed” may be great for propaganda, but not for soldiers. They need a term to indicate that something cannot continue to be used and cannot be (easily) repaired, especially not on site. For anything that cannot continue to be used as intended, with full operational capability, the military uses the term “incapable.”
The incapacitation of combat vehicles can be temporary, a small malfunction that can be addressed at the first opportunity and with local resources, repaired in the field within a few hours. A more serious incapacitation would result in the vehicle being driven or towed out of the battle theater, to be treated at a repair depot in Israel.
If a vehicle is beyond repair, it is often destroyed by its own side, burned or blown up, so the enemy cannot use it or remove useful parts.
Satellite photographs do not show many carcasses, and the number of Israeli soldiers killed in combat so far, estimated at 48 as of Wednesday morning, suggests that the number of vehicles actually destroyed is far lower than Hamas claims.
