The war in Gaza does not pose a major threat to world peace and international security. This statement may seem cynical, cold, or even uninformed, but it is true. Except one party outside Gaza can make it count for people’s pockets.
On the security front, despite its intensity, cruelty and number of civilian casualties, the war in Gaza is at best a narrow regional affair with only two sides seriously clashing, primarily in the Gaza Strip. It could be argued that the occupied West Bank is increasingly becoming a battlefield, but we are still far from full escalation.
The countries bordering Israel and the Palestinian territory: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt are balancing their rhetoric to show that they support the Palestinians and their cause, but intend to stay out of the conflict.
That said, Lebanese Hezbollah is fighting with Israel on a carefully considered and limited scale, as are several much smaller groups in Syria, but all are showing restraint and reluctance to allow the fighting in Gaza to turn into a regional war. wider. Jordan and Egypt remain in place and it would take a very significant escalation to draw them into any armed action.
More distant powers with interests and influence in the region, from Saudi Arabia to Turkey to Iran, the United States and a disunited Europe, are also moving cautiously, reluctant to expand the fighting. , whether in intensity or magnitude.
Economically, the war in Gaza itself has no impact on the global economy. The brutal bombings, indiscriminate attacks on unarmed citizens and civilian infrastructure, human suffering, misery, displacement, hunger and disease arouse international compassion but, even as the situation worsens, it is almost certain that the fighting will remain confined to Gaza because it will be business as usual. somewhere else.
Unless…
Small but determined
This informal and precarious balance of interests could be upset by the actions of a small but determined group: the Houthis of Yemen who are endangering navigation through the strategic Bab el-Mandeb passage between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean – a narrow passage which is the third largest in the world. chokepoint for oil shipments past the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca. More than six million barrels pass through it every day, mainly destined for Europe.
For an average ship traveling at 16 knots (30 km/h), passing through Bab el-Mandeb and Suez takes nine days less than circumnavigating Africa. It’s also cheaper: shipping experts estimate that the shortest route saves at least 15 percent on transportation.
But there are indirect costs: attacks on maritime traffic increase insurance rates, danger compensation for crews and other costs.
So while the war in Gaza costs citizens of neutral countries nothing, the Houthis’ position in the Red Sea could cause prices to skyrocket, first of oil, but then almost everything else would follow.
Can the Houthi attacks be stopped? The first step is always diplomacy, but almost no power recognizes or talks to the Houthis, let alone has any influence. The only exception is Iran, which supports the Houthis in principle but does not control them. No one knows their current relationship, but if Iran does indeed want the conflict to escalate, then the Houthis could act against its best advice. So even Iran may not be able to do much.
Sanctions would not work as the various sanctions imposed on Yemen have failed to stop the fighting over the past decade.
Attacks on international shipping, which intensified with the kidnapping of the Galaxy Leader in November and later culminated in rocket and drone attacks on unarmed commercial cargo ships and heavily armed warships of several countries, are not new to the Houthis.
They have a habit of attacking ships in the Red Sea. During their conflict with a Saudi-led Arab coalition in January 2017, they attacked the frigate Al Madinah using three remote-controlled unmanned explosive boats, forcing the Saudi Royal Navy to withdraw from Yemeni waters.
Encouraged by their success, in May and July 2018, they attacked two huge Saudi oil tankers with (Iranian-made) cruise missiles, similar to those used in recent attacks. Neutral-flagged ships were also attacked during the same period. To further complicate matters, in 2021, Iran and Israel engaged in an undeclared naval conflict in the Red Sea, along the Yemeni coast.
Following the seizure of the Galaxy Leader, the United States reportedly considered designating Ansar Allah, the official name of the Houthi movement, as a “terrorist group” for its involvement in “the hijacking of a ship in international waters.” But the United States acted cautiously, reportedly consulted with other countries and decided not (yet) to formalize this designation. No talks with Tehran have been reported, but they cannot be ruled out as Washington certainly did not want to risk pushing the Houthis’ big brother or its proxies like Hezbollah into an all-out war around Gaza.
Yet after the latest missile attacks on commercial ships, Washington is reportedly trying to put together a 12-nation coalition to counter the Houthi threat to shipping. Warships from at least four national navies: the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Israel are already active in the Red Sea and some have successfully thwarted attacks on themselves or land targets in Israel.
With a coalition, the number of warships would increase and they could attack targets in Yemen such as launch sites, command facilities and missile storage sites.
In addition to ships in the Red Sea, the Houthis have continued to target Israel, undeterred by the lack of tangible results. Israel intercepted a number of long-range missiles, some using land-based missile defenses, others over the Red Sea south of Eilat using Israeli warplanes. At least once, Israel’s most modern aircraft, the F-35, was used.
Fully aware of the coalition that is being prepared, the Houthis want to prevent it from becoming active and functional. Earlier this month, Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a member of the Houthis’ politburo, warned Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that if they joined such a coalition, the Houthis would target their oil platforms and facilities storage. The threat is realistic, with both countries’ oil infrastructures well within range of Houthi missiles.
Any major attack on oil facilities on the Arabian Peninsula would constitute a clear and global escalation, as it would drive up oil prices and increase insurance rates for international tankers loading along the coasts of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
It would be both paradoxical and cynical if the conflict, which has caused so much suffering and destruction and which has failed to move the world, were to escalate through attacks on neutral shipping.