Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG), the U.S. Navy-led coalition of the willing to keep international shipping safely moving through the Red Sea, is expected to be activated within days. Comprising allies from Europe and the Middle East, as well as Canada and Australia, the operation was snubbed by three major NATO countries, France, Italy and Spain.
What is OPG’s exact mission?
The official line, “ensuring the safe passage of commercial vessels,” is too vague for a naval flag officer to feel comfortable with. Admirals want politicians to give them specific tasks and clear mandates necessary to achieve the desired results.
Defining the threat seems easy so far: anti-ship missiles and drones of various types carrying explosive warheads target merchant ships en route to and from the Suez Canal. All were drawn from Yemen by the Houthi group also known as Ansar Allah, which now controls most of the country, including the longest section of its 450km Red Sea coast. All missiles were launched from the surface, with warheads capable of damaging but barely sinking large cargo ships.
The Houthis first announced that they would target Israeli-owned ships, then extended this measure to all those using Israeli ports, and ultimately to those trading with Israel. After several attacks in which the Israeli connection seemed very distant or vague, it is safe to assume that any ship could be targeted.
All missiles neutralized so far by American and French warships have been shot down by sophisticated onboard surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), proving that modern vertical launch systems guided by the latest generation phased array radars work as intended . Many countries intended to participate in OPG have ships with similar capabilities. Almost all are also equipped with modern surface-to-surface missiles capable of attacking targets at sea or on land.
If OPG’s task were to be defined narrowly, limited to preventing attacks on merchant ships, it could be accomplished using the time-honored principle of sailing in convoys with the protection of warships.
In a convoy, slow, defenseless commercial cargoes sail in multiple columns at precisely defined distances from each other – led, flanked and followed by fast warships capable of dealing with any threat. The system is effective, as the United Kingdom, Russia, Malta and many other countries saved by convoys during World War II can attest.
But each strategy has its limits. A convoy is large and bulky, stretching for miles to give the giant ships a safe distance from each other and allow them to maneuver if necessary. No matter what protective measures are taken, the huge oil tankers and container ships – more than 300 meters (984 feet) long – still pose big targets. Captains of commercial ships are generally not trained in convoy operations and most have no experience working in large groups or under military command.
Their escorts, even when well armed, carry a limited number of missiles and must plan their use carefully, allowing further attacks on the shipping lane and ultimately leaving a war reserve for the defense of the ship itself. Once they have used up some of their missiles, they must replenish them – a task that is possible at sea but is done much more quickly and safely in a friendly port, out of range of Houthi missiles.
To cross the critical 250 nautical miles (463 km) along the Yemeni coast leading to or from the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, moving at an assumed speed of 15 knots (28 km/h) – as convoys are still sailing at the speed of the slowest units – the ships would be exposed to even the shortest range Houthi missiles and drones for at least 16 hours.
And before even attempting to set sail, they would be particularly vulnerable in the transit zones of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden where ships would spend some time assembling, forming the convoy and getting underway.
We now know that the threat from Houthi missiles is high and that their arsenal is considerable. Naval planners must be concerned about their ability to launch concentrated and sustained attacks simultaneously from multiple directions.
This was demonstrated in the very first attack, on October 19, when the Houthis launched four cruise missiles and 15 drones at the USS Carney, a destroyer that still operates in the Red Sea and will be part of OPG. The attack, likely planned to test the Houthis’ attack doctrine and enemy response, lasted nine hours, requiring the target ship’s crew to remain ready and focused for an extended period to intercept any incoming missiles .
Any admiral would tell his political superiors that military necessity would require attacks on the Houthi missile infrastructure on the ground in Yemen: fixed and mobile launch sites, production and storage facilities, command centers and the few radar infrastructure that exists. A proactive response to the missile threat, in other words, aimed at destroying the targeting capability of Houthi ships, rather than a reactive response limited to shooting down missiles as they arrive.
In theory, attacks on Houthi missile infrastructure could be based on satellite and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) reconnaissance and carried out by missiles launched from the Red Sea and Indian Ocean and armed drones from distant land bases. But the only realistic chance of significant success would require the use of fighter jets and bombers based on the U.S. Navy’s two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in the region.
Attacks on targets in Yemen would have a clear military justification. But they would also carry an obvious political risk: that of seeing the West, and in particular the United States, be perceived in the Arab and Islamic world as effectively entering the war in Gaza on the side of Israel. After all, the Houthis claim that their attacks on Red Sea ships are aimed at getting Israel to end the war.
Aware of the perils of such a development that could easily cause an expansion of the conflict, the United States has tried to tread carefully, engaging with regional powers and sending messages that it does not want to ‘escalation. He even openly demanded that his ally Israel limit civilian suffering and end the conflict as quickly as possible – to no avail.
The White House and the Pentagon are now walking on hot coals. If they do nothing, the Red Sea route will quickly be closed, causing significant damage to the American, European and Asian economies. If the half-measures they are currently proposing, simply escorting convoys without attacking ground missile sites, fail to guarantee safe passage, they will have lost face and failed to prevent a slowdown. economic. And if the United States is ultimately forced to attack, it will have directly contributed to a dangerous escalation that could be difficult to contain.
Aware of all these dilemmas, France, Italy and Spain are playing it safe: they will “unilaterally” deploy their frigates in the Red Sea to “protect the ships of their respective nations”. If the U.S. Navy ends up attacking Yemen, the Europeans could argue that they did not contribute to the escalation of the war, thus placing all the blame on the United States.