Claims and denials of a possible ceasefire in Gaza continue. Some reports indicate a three-day break in fighting, while others extend the truce to a full five days. Yet others say the ceasefire could begin imminently. And so on.
Even the statements coming from the horse’s mouth differ. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu denied a Washington Post report on Saturday that an agreement in principle had been reached; a U.S. representative confirmed that talks were continuing but that progress was still expected.
On Sunday, Qatar Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani announced in Doha that remaining differences between Hamas and Israel were “very minor.” Qatar played a central role in mediation efforts during the war, particularly for the release of Israeli captives.
The last to be heard on the subject was Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, who told the Reuters news agency on Tuesday that the parties were “close to reaching a truce agreement.” Another Hamas official told Tel Aviv Tribune that the negotiations focused on the duration of the truce, the details of delivering aid to Gaza and the exchange of hostages and prisoners.
When there is smoke there is fire. While most parties involved seek a temporary end to the carnage in Gaza, there is hope for a small step toward temporary respite.
It is also prudent to examine why the two warring sides are considering such a pause.
Although such a pause would benefit Hamas politically, militarily there appears to be no obvious gain – as I will explain on Wednesday.
For Israel, on the other hand, suspending the war could be advantageous from a military point of view and disadvantageous from a political point of view.
The Israeli war machine has been operating at full capacity for six weeks in the air and three weeks on the ground in Gaza. Since the Hamas attacks, Israeli aerial bombardments have continued at a surprisingly high rate.
It was clear from day one that the primary purpose of these merciless shellings against Palestinian civilian targets was not military. Initially, many analysts believed that the intense air attacks served to demonstrate to the Israeli population that the armed forces were doing something and that the bombing would be eased once ground forces intervened.
Even a country that prides itself on being ready for war must maintain large reserves of arms and ammunition.
Omar Bradley, a US Army general during World War II, once said, “Amateurs talk about strategy, professionals talk about logistics.” Forward Israeli commanders may be eager to continue pounding Gaza no matter what, but the rear echelon has done the math and doesn’t like the result. There are reliable reports, escaping military secrecy, that the Israeli Air Force (IAF) is running out of smart bombs.
It is always difficult to judge the credibility of allegations in military matters. Sometimes an officer disappointed with his side – especially when it fights outside its borders or inflicts heavy civilian casualties – anonymously divulges crucial details.
Several specialized online forums claim that the IAF, after spending more than 2,500 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) smart bomb kits over Gaza, has only 10 days of supplies left.
Each army regulates the amount of ammunition that must remain in reserve in case of emergency. The exact figures are a closely guarded secret, but all indications are that Israeli quartermasters have sounded the alarm, demanding urgent resupply.
Specialized military items can be purchased to fill in the gaps. In 1973, with Israel close to running out of supplies to fight Syria, Egypt and their Arab allies, the United States launched “Operation Nickel Grass”, the largest military airlift in the world. ‘history. The US Air Force transported nearly 1,000 tons of weapons and munitions to Israel every day, for a total of more than 22,000 tons.
This is repeated today, albeit on a smaller scale. For the past two weeks, American C-17 transports have been landing regularly at Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport and Nevatim Air Base in the Negev Desert.
Most of the planes arrive from Ramstein Air Base in Germany, where the United States has warehouses full of “prepositioned stock” — equipment reserved for military emergencies.
There is no doubt that heavier, less urgent supplies are being shipped to Israel by sea. Among them will surely be refueling rockets for the tracked version of the High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) which has been used extensively in Gaza.
In October, the United States launched its own missiles intended for the Iron Dome air defense system at Israel. Israel’s response to early Hamas heavy rocket attacks and attacks by Hezbollah and the Houthis depleted Israel’s stockpiles to such an alarming level that it requested all of the Tamir interceptor missiles the United States had purchased and kept in Israel until deployed.
Israeli forces would also appreciate a break from fighting to evaluate their tactics so far in light of their performance against the Hamas tunnels. As many analysts have warned – myself included – despite dogs, robots, ground-penetrating radar and other technology, the tunnels can only be destroyed once soldiers have entered the interior. It’s a bloody task, as proven last week when four commandos were killed by an improvised explosive device after opening a tunnel lid.
A few days ago, an unidentified Israeli officer briefing journalists embedded with Israeli forces admitted: “We don’t want to go there. We know they left us a lot of side bombs. The London weekly The Jewish Chronicle reported on November 16 that the standing orders were clear: “No one is allowed to enter a tunnel.”
Israeli forces must also examine the effectiveness of their allegedly sophisticated and specialized training on simulators in Gaza City. Certain simulation assumptions based on the 2009 and 2014 incursions into Gaza turned out to be not applicable in 2023. It will also be necessary to analyze why so many Merkava tanks, considered almost invincible, were neutralized. Reliable reports indicate that up to 30 of them have been destroyed or are too damaged to use.
While the military would appreciate a three or five day reprieve – but probably wouldn’t admit it – politicians would clearly see it as a loss.
Netanyahu and his hawks have strongly opposed any pause, so if they agree to it now, the public will view it as their weakness, no matter how they try to justify their submission to international pressure. The fact that US President Joe Biden, Israel’s closest theoretical ally, has thrown his weight behind securing a breakup must rub salt in the Israeli prime minister’s wounds.
If the agreed no-combat period is respected, which always poses a great risk, Israeli politicians will face new pressures at the end of this period; the world might ask, “If it was a success, why not just extend it?” »
Netanyahu’s biggest nightmare would be to reach the point where he not only fails to destroy Hamas, but recognizes it de facto by negotiating, even indirectly. Deprived of Gaza, furious Israelis would certainly attack its political skin.
