Nearly 23,000 people – the vast majority Palestinian – have been killed since Hamas’s unprecedented attacks in southern Israel on October 7, which triggered the Israeli assault on Gaza.
As the end of 2023 approaches, the Israeli offensive shows no signs of slowing down and the death toll is sure to rise on both sides as the fighting continues.
Political attempts at peace have failed.
Israel declared from the beginning that its goal was to eliminate Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities. To this end, it has continued the aerial bombardment and ground invasion of the Gaza Strip almost continuously since October 7.
Although Israel admits that it has failed in this mission so far, it asserts that it is only a matter of time before it achieves this goal. But does the situation on the ground support this assertion?
The answer is a cautious no.
A detailed and impartial analysis of various aspects of its performance leads to the conclusion that so far Hamas has enjoyed more successes than failures – for the following reasons.
Hamas continues to exist
The organization is still very much alive and dynamic. Politically, it is still recognized – de facto if not de jure – as the sole entity exercising control over what remains of the heavily damaged civilian structures in the Gaza Strip.
It is party to indirect negotiations that have already succeeded in producing a week-long pause in the assault on Gaza and a limited exchange of Israeli and Palestinian captives and hostages. As long as it retains its remaining hostages, Hamas will continue to be an inevitable “other party” without which no release of these captives will be possible.
Israel has repeatedly declared that there is “no place” for Hamas in Gaza’s post-war civilian structures, but has never presented any semblance of a concrete alternative plan.
Various vague and unclear suggestions that Gaza’s future would be better without Hamas have been thrown around, but no one has produced a coherent suggestion on how to remove Hamas and what to replace it with.
The United States, some Arab states and various international organizations have suggested that post-war Gaza should be ruled by Fatah or a pan-Arab force, but have presented no tangible plans for how to achieve this. For now, this remains wishful thinking. For the foreseeable future, Hamas is therefore here to stay.
Hamas remains an effective military force Hamas’ military wing, the Qassam Brigades, has never publicly disclosed information about its structure, organization or personnel.
Some experts, using open sources and leaked intelligence from Israeli, American, Arab and Russian sources, estimate the strength of the Qassam Brigades at between 30,000 and 45,000 fighters.
Even the most conservative analysts estimate that before the war the force may have had at least 18,000 well-trained, disciplined and ideologically highly motivated front-line troops in its ranks, with anything above that number constituting the second echelon.
The various Israeli claims that up to 10,000 Hamas fighters were killed are certainly exaggerated.
The Qassam Brigades suffered heavy losses, but most of their battalions remain effective combat units. The Institute for the Study of War, an influential and well-informed US think tank, estimates that of the 26 to 30 combat battalions believed to exist as of October 7 – each numbering 400 to 1,000 men – only three have been rendered inoperative – or, in civil parlance, destroyed.
Among the others, four or five have been “degraded”, that is to say their numbers are reduced but they continue to fight, either alone or by joining other units.
In one sense, Hamas’s military wing proved exceptionally effective: all units whose commanders were killed nevertheless continued to fight under the leadership of their deputies.
Drawing on its excellent on-the-ground intelligence, Israel managed to kill at least five battalion commanders in targeted air raids, and at least six others died in combat, including the commander of the Northern Brigade. Yet none of these units were rendered “headless” and collapsed, confirming Hamas’ evident ability to plan and train competent deputies.
Israel destroyed or blocked tunnel entrances wherever it could find them, but there are clear signs that Hamas still maintains enough underground facilities to move its forces between the front lines and often manages to bypass and surprise the ‘enemy.
Hamas benefits from the support of other armed factions
Reports from Gaza sometimes give the impression that Hamas’ armed wing, the Qassam Brigades, is doing all the fighting. In fact, there are no fewer than 12 different armed groups, affiliated with different political and ideological blocs. The second best known is Islamic Jihad, but others include the Popular Resistance Committee and two Palestine Liberation Fronts of almost the same name – one calling itself “popular” while the other is “democratic.” .
The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the armed wing of its rival Fatah, are probably the most unlikely to be associated with Hamas. However, beyond political differences, it fights in coordination and largely under the general command of the Qassam Brigades.
Bringing all of these groups under the Hamas umbrella is a pragmatic solution born of necessity, but it appears to be working to the satisfaction of everyone involved, with no tensions or cracks visible so far.
There have been no reliable claims that this plethora of smaller units buckled under pressure from the Israeli armed forces, disbanded, deserted, or collaborated with the enemy. Furthermore, we cannot exclude that some of them will merge, at least temporarily, with the Qassam Brigades.
The continued coexistence of these armed factions while facing the same threat is undoubtedly a success for Hamas.
Hamas has gained popularity in the West Bank
Contrary to the predominant image in Israel and the West of Hamas as an unacceptable terrorist and murderer of innocent civilians – a view particularly reinforced after reports of indiscriminate massacres on October 7 – many Palestinians view it in a negative light. different.
Those who see themselves as victims of Israeli oppression, unequal treatment, lawlessness and discrimination often idolize Hamas as a fearless defender of the Palestinians, and often as the only group to do so. . Many young people born since the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, which were supposed to result in a two-state solution, admit to being frustrated by the Palestinian authorities’ inability to achieve what was agreed, promised and signed in those accords.
This sense of frustration has become particularly strong in the West Bank, led by Fatah, seen by many young people as ineffective, corrupt, incapable and uninterested in working for the Palestinian cause.
Increasing attacks by illegal Israeli settlers, who continue to harass, rob and inflict violence in the West Bank with impunity, have further alienated Palestinians.
Many West Bank Palestinians have responded to the war in Gaza by openly flying Hamas flags, often alongside those of Fatah. Young Palestinians living in a fortified and dismembered West Bank have long resented being passive outsiders, always subject to this kind of treatment.
Many now place their hopes and expectations on those who stood up, fought back and hit Israel hard, even though Israel is much stronger.
Although this view may defy logic and seem shocking to outsiders, there is no doubt that it is genuine.
Even if Israel were to achieve its goal of “ending” Hamas – a completely unrealistic prospect – many Palestinians would remember Hamas as the only group that refused to sit back passively and simply take blow after blow from Israel.
Despite the heavy losses it has suffered and the image it has acquired in the West, Hamas probably has more reason to be satisfied than worried.