Israel continued its ground action inside the Gaza Strip on Sunday, which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called a “second phase.”
Semantics aside, the neither very large nor fast enough movement that has been taking place over the past three days constitutes an advance compared to the two previous rapid nocturnal incursions. But not a total invasion.
Soldiers call this reconnaissance in force. In preparation for an offensive, smaller units attack to probe their enemies’ positions, strength, tactics, and operational readiness. Initial battle plans are then adapted based on the knowledge acquired.
Despite this, Israel’s ground advance seems timid: it is smaller and slower than the great push that ministers and generals boasted about.
Some experts could see this as a sign that the Israeli army does not have sufficient weapons reserves. But this cannot be the case, because the aerial bombardments and long-range bombardments of Gaza have continued unabated for more than three weeks now, causing huge indiscriminate losses.
Hamas casualties are unknown, but it is likely that the ratio of people killed in Gaza amounts to hundreds of Palestinian civilians for every Hamas fighter killed.
Israel’s slow progress may be deliberate, to allow for diplomacy, secret talks and backroom deals. Its neighbors – Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria – do not want the conflict to escalate and are careful not to fuel it in any way. Qatar is leading diplomatic efforts to free prisoners held by Hamas and avoid further escalation.
The position of two major regional powers with powerful armies, Turkey and Iran, is quite special.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sharply criticized Israel on Saturday, calling it an occupier in his speech at a massive rally in support of Palestine on the eve of the 100th anniversary of the Turkish republic.
Turkey’s criticism of Israel is almost certain to remain political, but Iran’s position is more complex and what it might do remains an enigma.
Iran is a sworn enemy of Israel. It has created, trained, organized, armed and continues to support a series of sub-state armed groups in the region. The largest and best known of these is Hezbollah based in Lebanon, but Iran also has a presence through proxies in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, countries where bloody conflicts have taken place or are in class.
The big question is whether Iran will join – directly – in a war for Gaza.
The analysis suggests that Tehran would lose more than it gains by getting involved in a major war. There are only two ways for Iran to wage the fight against Israel: land and ballistic.
By land, he would have to cross Iraq and Syria. Both are allies of Iran, but neither would willingly allow its territory to be used, even if the move were militarily plausible. The United States, which still maintains a security presence and has interests in Iraq, would not be very pleased. The government in Damascus, which controls the areas Iran is expected to pass through, knows that even a temporary presence of the Iranian army could easily reignite the Syrian conflict.
Such an adventurous march across the deserts is not militarily plausible: it would mean crossing 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) from Iran to Israel, under skies in which the United States and its allies have supremacy uncontested air.
Iran’s other option could be to launch its formidable long-range ballistic arsenal against Israel, whose Iron Dome already struggles to counter Hamas’ crude but deadly missiles.
But Tehran’s generals have been trying for decades to predict possible responses to their use of missiles – and apparently have concluded that most would be unfavorable to Iran.
If some decision-makers in Tehran thought their missiles could somehow overwhelm enemy defenses, this came cruelly to fruition on October 19, when a U.S. Navy destroyer deployed to the Red Sea intercepted and shot down no less than four cruise missiles launched. against Israel from Yemen by Houthi fighters supported by Iran. The USS Carney also shot down 14 drones. It’s unclear whether the Houthis independently decided to go after Israel, or whether Tehran had a say, but the fate of those missiles was a message to both.
The US Navy has demonstrated a 100 percent success rate against en route missiles; in Israel, the Iron Dome is believed to consistently intercept more than 90% of incoming projectiles. Faced with this, it would be militarily logical for Iran to abandon missile warfare.
So how will the situation evolve? Although it is difficult and risky to make such a bold claim, I believe the United States has reason to believe that no state actor will join the fighting in Gaza. Unless there is a major escalation of force or a move aimed at the total expulsion of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.
The current “war”, geographically limited, should therefore not turn into a wider regional conflagration, a message which will have been clearly transmitted to all countries through diplomatic channels and intermediaries having contact with both parties. US President Joe Biden reiterated American support for Israel, but also made several statements calling for de-escalation and that negotiations over the release of the hostages be given a chance. But if discussions take place, won’t some participants try to push them further?
The real reason for the unprecedented deployment of US forces in the region – with an aircraft carrier battle group in the Mediterranean and another in the Gulf and the strengthening of reconnaissance, surveillance and electronic intelligence assets as well as a small force ground – is to discourage any senseless moves by rogue generals or non-state armed groups like Hezbollah.
For this plan to have a chance, all avenues to defusing the conflict must be explored – including asking America’s ally Israel to slow down enough to save face domestically, while still giving time for negotiations likely to ensure the release of all or part of the hostages.
Whatever the numbers involved and the timeline, this would be an encouraging step.