On Sunday, Houthi fighters hijacked a cargo ship in the Red Sea, off the coast of Yemen.
The 189-meter-long Galaxy Leader car carrier, traveling from Turkey to India, was intercepted by small, fast boats and boarded by armed personnel in uniform.
Others abseiled from a helicopter onto the bridge, ordering the crew to change course toward the Yemeni port of Hodeida.
No shots were fired and the seized vessel is a civilian ship sailing between neutral countries, but the incident could still spark a serious escalation in the latest Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In the worst case scenario, this could be the first step toward direct U.S. and Iranian involvement in the war.
Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sare’e confirmed that the ship was seized because it “belonged to Israelis”, in line with his earlier announcement that the group “would not hesitate to target any Israeli vessel in the Red Sea or any other place we can reach.” Israel has denied any connection to the ship, although ownership details in public shipping databases suggest it is owned by one of Israel’s richest men.
Most of the Red Sea stretches more than 200 km (124 miles), but its southern end, the Bab al-Mandeb Passage, is a chokepoint less than 20 km (12 miles) wide , from the Yemeni island of Mayyun to the coast of Djibouti and Eritrea. Every year, more than 17,000 ships pass through it. That’s almost 50 per day.
Many of them have legal status, such as the Galaxy Leader, which flies the flag of the Bahamas, is operated by a Japanese company and has a Bulgarian captain and a crew from at least five other countries, none of whom are Israeli. In the complex world of shipping, ownership of a ship is less important than the ship’s flag, which indicates its country of registry and operating company.
The Bahamas offers what is known as a “flag of convenience”. It is a country with low taxes and less strict labor policies, which incentivizes operators to register their vessels there. The operating company is the Japanese company Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha, known as NYK Line, which operates 818 vessels.
Among the nearly 1,500 ships transiting the strait each month, many could be linked to Israel and would therefore be vulnerable to further hijacking by the Houthis.
Shipping must continue no matter what, so will all “Israel-linked” ships simply be left at the mercy of the Houthis?
Probably not, but the options for preventing further diversions are limited to three: sending armed ships to accompany commercial traffic, destroying or severely limiting the Houthis’ offensive capacity at sea, and persuading them to refrain from attacking.
For the first option, the question is who could provide armed naval patrols in the Red Sea?
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, countries bordering the Red Sea, have powerful and sophisticated navies. But Saudi Arabia maintains an uneasy truce with the Houthis, which they are loath to disrupt. Egypt is trying to remain neutral and would also not want to get drawn into tensions with the Houthis. Israel cannot spare any ship for this task.
The only force remaining to confront the Houthi threat would be the US Navy.
Since October 7, the United States has deployed numerous assets in the Middle East, centered around two carrier strike groups (CSG). The one in the Mediterranean, CSG 12, is led by the newest and most modern nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford. CSG 2, currently in the Gulf of Oman, is led by the USS Dwight D Eisenhower. Each aircraft carrier is accompanied by a guided-missile cruiser, two or three destroyers, and a flotilla of auxiliaries, such as tankers, store ships, and mobile repair bases.
Each of the two CSGs has a clearly defined task: CSG 12 is to monitor the wider area of Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq and to act against any threats that could escalate the dispute. CSG 2 is there to monitor Iran and act against it if the situation deteriorates.
The CSG Eisenhower is kept outside the Strait of Hormuz to directly signal to Iran that the United States does not yet have hostile intentions. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has made clear that his country will continue to support Hamas and the Palestinian people, but that he does not want to go to war himself.
Thus, the CSG 2 demonstrates an intention far from being warlike, by remaining in the Gulf of Oman, from where its planes could always reach targets inside Iran if the need arises or it could move into the Gulf in the unlikely event that the United States wants to increase its threat.
Apart from the CSGs, the US Navy also has individual ships that monitor Houthi missile launches. On October 19, the USS Carney shot down several Houthi missiles and drones targeting Israel.
As all of these assets have specific tasks, American options are limited. The only ships that can be used to escort commercial shipping are those clustered around the amphibious aircraft carrier USS Bataan, currently just south of Suez. Moving it south would weaken the United States’ ability to respond to any escalation around Gaza.
Which brings us to the second option. The Houthis are known for their willingness to confront even more powerful enemies. The United States directly targeting them could risk a major escalation. Washington could ask Israel to target Houthi ports with long-range missiles, but even that remains risky.
So we come to the third option, de-escalation.
It seems that once again, Iran is the key. If the capture of the Galaxy Leader was an independent action by the Houthis not initiated by Tehran, the United States could engage in quiet diplomacy to incentivize Iran to rein in its proxy and avoid further diversions at sea.
This might be the most realistic solution, but only if all parties involved exercise restraint.
The stakes are high. A further diversion could have a snowball effect, drawing other countries more actively into an already devastating conflict and pushing it to the point of no return.