With the beginning of this spring, and specifically last March, the Sudanese army had defeated the Rapid Support Forces of Muhammad Hamdan Daglo (Hamidati) from Khartoum. The Sudanese Armed Forces regained the Republican Palace, and this was a crime of a series of defeats of Hamidi’s forces, which continued even after regaining control of Khartoum.
However, this did not mean that Hamidi has admitted defeat yet, his regional relationships and tribal alliances crossing the borders of Sudan, and the resources that he controls and give him an extraordinary financial capacity, all that enabled him to transfer the war in Sudan to a new and dangerous stage, which can be entrusted with the war of drones.
The Rapid Support Forces, which were defeated on the ground, began using drones in unprecedented intense attacks on areas that were previously safe, which may change the form of the current war, or transfer it to a new stage, perhaps the last is probably the last.
Between 4 and 7 May, the Rapid Support Forces continued to bomb Port Sudan daily with drones. These aircraft hit targets in the East far from their strongholds, targeting strategic locations that include fuel tanks, ammunition warehouse, military base, and the city’s main power station, in addition to the airport. Port Sudan is the actual capital of the Sudanese government on the Red Sea coast.
Some of these attacks have caused huge fires and power outages throughout the city, forcing the authorities to suspend flights for some time as a precaution, which caused a shock among the population.
The attack expansion
The rapid support forces of the aircraft running on Port Sudan were not limited. In recent months, with the end of the Sudanese armed forces the influence of Hamidi’s forces in central Sudan, those forces have increasingly directed their paths to the vital infrastructure that serves the Sudanese, as well as military targets in many areas that they have recovered or controlled by the Sudanese Jais.
The Rapid Support Forces act as a rebel militia targeting the capabilities of the Sudanese, along with the army’s strengths only. Among the most prominent incidents indicating this is what happened in the Meroe Dam last January, when marches of the Rapid Support Forces bombed the largest electromagnet in the country, which led to the destruction of transformers and power outages in large areas of northern Sudan.
The Meroe Dam is produced between 40% and 60% of Sudan’s electricity, so its disruption was immediate effects on hospitals, water stations and civilian life in the regions.
Likewise, on April 25, the planes of the Atbara sub -power station in the Nile River state, and this caused a large fire and electricity cut off from the states of the Nile and the Red Sea, and this increased the stress of the population who already suffered.
Between late 2024 and March 2025, nearly 50 drones were recorded on infrastructure and logistical sites in northern Sudan, and about half of these raids focused on the Meroe Dam, Dongola Airport and Atbara Airport.
Strategic goals
Each of these incidents highlights the strategy of the emerging rapid support forces represented in the use of drones to strike the capabilities of the Sudanese and the armed forces so that they are less ready, and to inform the Sudanese people confidence in the army and its ability to protect them.
By attacking vital infrastructure, such as electricity networks, fuel warehouses and remote bases, the Rapid Support Forces seek to undermine the ability of the central government to rule and wage war, or in a clearer sense, the goal is to make safe areas insecure.
Then the Rapid Support Forces aim to prove that even if the Sudanese armed forces take control of cities such as Khartoum or Port Sudan, they cannot fully secure them from these attacks.
So, we are facing a form of psychological warfare that aims to destabilize the eastern and northern Sudan, and thus the Rapid Support Forces try to say that even if Khartoum loses, the Sudanese armed forces cannot claim that they won the war.
In addition to this, another aspect, by hitting airports and warehouses far from the confrontation lines, the Rapid Support Forces sought to deplete the defenses of the Sudanese Armed Forces, and undermine their ability to strengthen or re -supply forces.
Besides, the marches war is proportional to the current situation of the Rapid Support Forces. After expelling from central Sudan to its western base, she may find it difficult to launch large -scale traditional operations in the east. Therefore, drones allow a way to continue offensive action from a distance, and thus Sudan has already entered the stage of the marches war.
In the end, the Rapid Support Forces depends on the drones in recognition of the limited human power and its air capacity compared to the National Army, in an endeavor to employ technology to balance the conflict.
Various marches
Indeed, the rapid supporting forces give the rapid support to compensate for their loss to the land, allowing them to cause strategic damage, and spreading fear to beyond the traditional confrontation lines.
Essentially, the Rapid Support Forces use what is known as the ammunition that is shouted in these battles, which are relatively small marches, flying over the target area, and when you find an opportunity to hit him as a shell. These relatively low -cost drones, and can be used in coordinated swarms.
The suicide bombers used by the Rapid Support Forces were described as planes with a delta wings equipped with dubbed engines and box structures, which is an improved design of the tasks of the attack in one direction, and analysts noted that modern versions of these shiny drones appear with improved forms or features (such as a smaller radar fingerprint or higher speed) that make them more able to penetrate the air defenses.
Each plane carries a limited load march, but the coordinated squadron can cause severe damage, as happened in the Port Sudan attacks that set fire to fuel tanks and caused damage to infrastructure.
Besides, these marches are used with a clear military tactic. In Port Sudan, for example, the Rapid Support Forces fired a first wave of 11 suicide march aircraft in an attack on Othman Daknah Air Force Base and other sites.
Most of these small aircraft were dropped by the army forces, but they were tactical dispersal, because while the air defenses were busy with tackling the squadron, a second attack with a single “strategy” plane was launched, which was able to penetrate the fortifications, and hit the target of high value in the military base.
This tactic, which is to dump the defenses with multiple suicide marches before sending a more deadly march, highlights the relatively advanced running aircraft strategy for the Rapid Support Forces.
In addition to the suicide marches, larger and long -term combat aircraft were believed to be believed to be tray, as satellite images in late 2024 and early 2025 revealed the presence of advanced running planes at Nyala Airport, which is controlled by the Rapid Support Forces in South Darfur.
Defense analysts from the “Gains” Foundation identified these running planes, and they were most likely found that they are “CH-95” of Chinese Science and Technology of Space Technology, which are advanced planes capable of monitoring and microscopy over distances of up to 200 km or more, with a flight from 6 to 12 hours, a maximum height of 7 thousand meters, and the speed of launch more than 200 Km/hour.
This means that the medium -altitude and long -term march, its wings is about 12 meters long, and is able to carry day and night photovoltaic reconnaissance systems, a specialized radar, accurately directed ammunition, communications means, and electronic warfare equipment.
Technically, these larger drones can fly at high altitudes for long periods and carry a much heavier load of suicide rapid support forces. For example, a CH-95 drone can launch guided bombs or air-to-surface missiles against point targets, or even use them as a shyman to carry out a suicide attack itself.
It gives its range and durability; Rapid support forces are the ability to hit strategic infrastructure such as fuel depots in Port Sudan or Meroe network, without the need for actual presence nearby. However, the operation of such advanced drones requires training and logistical and possibly external experience, which are factors indicating foreign interference in strengthening the driving program for the Rapid Support Forces.
The army’s reaction
The Sudanese army must now transfer its anti -aircraft units and monitoring systems to protect infrastructure in the heart of the country, which may limit what can be provided for the front lines attacks in Kordofan or Darfur, and this may delay plans to launch a major attack in western Sudan, which the Rapid Support Forces control large parts of western Sudan, the goal of the Sudanese armed forces after the restoration of Khartoum.
In the face of the threat of rapid support forces’ marches, the Sudanese armed forces have already resorted to adapting to this threat through their own defenses and tactics to confront drones.
In the short term, the Sudanese Armed Forces units around Port Sudan responded to the May attacks using anti -aircraft fire to intercept and shoot down many upcoming drones.
It is likely that the Sudanese Armed Forces have re -deployed short -range air defense systems (such as anti -aircraft guns and mobile missile units) in potential targeted locations in the north and east to enhance their capabilities to intercede the drones.
It also indicates that the army uses electronic warfare measures, such as disturbing signals and radio frequency detectors to disrupt the direction of the drones.
In addition to the field defenses, the Sudanese Armed Forces have taken wider steps to alleviate the danger of drones. Among these steps is proactive strikes of the Rapid Support Forces, as the Sudanese Air Force has repeatedly bombed Nyala Airport, which is controlled by the Rapid Support Forces in South Darfur, which is believed to be a launching point or storage of some largest large -sized support aircraft.
Satellite photos show that Nyala Airport was exposed to repeated shelling in early 2025, as air strikes destroyed the airplanes and newly built aircraft barriers, which are believed to have marches.
In early February, it was reported that an air raid launched by the Sudanese Armed Forces on Nyala resulted in the killing of dozens and the destruction of a large part of the infrastructure of rapid support enlightenings. The elimination of drones on the ground or its objection before reaching its targets is an essential part of the Sudanese Armed Forces strategy.
The Sudanese armed forces also use their own fleet of drones in the face of threats. Thanks to the provision of Turkish Bayrakdar planes, and possibly other drones, they can perform air control operations to monitor the activities of rapid support aircraft, and even try to shoot down while flying with accurate missiles that can be used against slow -moving air targets, although its main role was hitting the ground targets.
During the Port Sudan attacks, the army temporarily stopped the civil aviation movement, imposed a flight ban to avoid any accidental clashes and to unleash air defenses in confronting the drones. This interactive measure emphasizes the seriousness of the Sudanese Armed Forces in dealing with the threat as soon as it appears.
The development of the army’s capabilities
This means that the army is developing its capabilities to confront the path of arms, which is mainly one of the confessions of rapid support for defeat (by beating from a distance).
In strategic terms, the drones campaign risked the expansion of the regional dimension of the conflict, as Sudan’s neighbors and international supporters noticed the ability of the rapid support forces to hit a coastal city on the Red Sea.
Military analyst Alan Bouswell warns to the Washington Post that this is a dramatic escalation that expands the geographical and strategic scope of the war, adding that such strikes deepen regional tensions by literally transferring the war to the gates of countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt across the Red Sea.
In the mighty legend of Shamson, the biblical hero stands on the edge of the ruin, captive among his enemies after his strength was robbed. But in a moment of anger and last despair, he gathered the last remaining of his might and pushes the pillars of the temple to drop it over everyone’s heads.
Is the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, in an aspect of their behavior today, Shamson has lost his compass? Perhaps this is an aspect of the war of rapid support forces with marches, as an important part of it intentionally presses the lives of the Sudanese themselves, and after the rapid support forces form, the war began two years ago on the pretext of protecting the state and identity, here it is hitting cities and villages.
As if, after she was defeated and excluded from the center of the authority and was despair of returning, she decided not to keep anything or off, and the misfortunes were the weapon that Hamidi’s forces used in an attempt to destroy the temple on the heads of everyone, but the behavior of the Sudanese army in return is in parallel with the form of the battle, and adapts to its variables on the ground, which means that he realizes the intentions of rapid support, and works to neutralize them.