Hezbollah re-published aerial reconnaissance scenes of the areas (northern Israel) and the port of Haifa under the title “Under the title This is what the hoopoe came back with,” posing the eternal question that has accompanied Israel since its establishment in 1948 regarding deterrence and considering it the cornerstone of the Israeli security concept, as Israel was not Its security doctrine is still based on three elements: deterrence, warning, and decisiveness.
The Israeli security theory was based on the need for its army to enjoy qualitative superiority, whether in weapons and equipment, organization, training, leadership or morale, so that this military force would have a deterrent capacity and possess the potential for practical decisiveness at the same time.
According to many analysts in this regard, what Hezbollah broadcast “carries security, political, military, and economic messages.” The scenes sent by the party show “a visualization of what the war would look like if it occurred, and how Hezbollah would progress” in it.
As if the most important message sent by these scenes revealed Hezbollah’s intentions, which could deter Israel “to a large extent.” This event represents a “qualitative shift” in the confrontation between the two parties.
This is confirmed by Lior Ben-Ari in the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, as he believes that “the purpose of the publication is to deter and suggest that if Israel starts the war, Hezbollah will inflict military and economic harm on it if it dares to attack Lebanon.”
If Israel believed that it had established the concept of “relative deterrence” with Hezbollah, according to Israeli Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy, the Lebanese party went beyond that and sent a message to Israel, according to what sources close to Hezbollah told Tel Aviv Tribune, that the bank of objectives had become clear and ready, especially since what was published. According to those sources, it is a small part of the clips and pictures the party has of the aforementioned area.
These scenes also show the failure of Halevy’s assessment that he presented at the Herzliya conference entitled “Strategy and Planning in the Age of Uncertainty” in May 2023, as the Lebanese party is no longer “deterred from an all-out war,” as Halevy said.
Deterrence eroded in 2006
What has happened since the Battle of Al-Aqsa Flood on October 7 shows that this theory of deterrence no longer exists and that the resistance forces, whether in the Gaza Strip or Hezbollah in Lebanon, have gone beyond the matter and the two parties are now seeking to create a deterrent force against Israel, according to what military analysts say.
Israel’s deterrent power has begun to erode since the 2006 war on southern Lebanon, as Israel was unable to impose a new equation in its conflict with Hezbollah in that war.
Political analyst Mahmoud Muhareb says that “in order to strengthen Israel’s deterrence capacity, every military confrontation must end with a quick, tangible and clearly visible military victory with minimal losses, especially human losses,” which did not happen in the 2006 war.
Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli military sites, and their precise targeting after the flood of Al-Aqsa, prompted Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid to say that “what is burning is not only the north, but Israeli deterrence and Israeli honor.”
Iran…the collapse of the balance of terror
The effects of the Al-Aqsa Flood Battle and its imposition of new equations with Israel, especially its security concept of deterrence, show that the Iranian “sincere promise” attack with marches and missiles on Israel last April cannot be ignored. Ariel Schmiedeberg, a journalist on the Walla news website, considered that Israel and the US The United States failed to create “deterrence against Iran, which has demonstrated tremendous strength and unprecedented courage, and this is evidence of the collapse of the balance of terror that was not completely balanced against Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is what Israel fears.”
The West Bank.. “An Undeterred Generation”
The Israeli theory of deterrence on the Palestinian front has collapsed since the storming of the Jenin camp in July 2023. According to statements by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other officials, among the goals of storming the Jenin camp is “restoring the deterrence equation.”
Palestinian analyst Khalil Shaheen, in previous statements to Tel Aviv Tribune, considered the Israeli operation “a complete failure in the military sense, and we witnessed a withdrawal under fire that was more like an escape, during which a soldier was killed and others were injured, in a resounding scandal for the army and its leaders.”
He pointed to leaks that preceded the withdrawal, talking about recommendations from the military level regarding the necessity of ending the operation because its objectives were not achieved, and that “the army went to restore deterrence, but it left in a humiliating manner, with greater damage to deterrence.”
The Israeli Chief of Staff attributes the increase in the pace of resistance operations in the West Bank to the emergence of “an undeterred young generation that did not experience the Defensive Shield campaign in 2002,” according to what he said at the Herzliya Security Conference 5 months before the Al-Aqsa flood.
Since then, resistance operations in the West Bank have not calmed down or stopped, but rather their geographical spread has increased.
Al-Aqsa flood.. “derailment”
Last October 7, the Al-Aqsa Flood Battle came as a painful blow to the theory of deterrence and to all the security theories that Israel has sought to formulate since its establishment more than 70 years ago.
This can be understood from what Halevy presented at the Herzliya Conference, where he considered at the time that Israel was managing matters within a strategic triangle whose upper central angle was “deterrence and preparedness,” and the two angles of the triangle’s base were preventing the military power of the resistance factions from growing, and ensuring the continuation of the civilian humanitarian effort “which helps stabilize the situation.” Gaza is terrified.”
In the wake of the war launched by Israel on the Gaza Strip against the Islamic Jihad movement in 2022, Halevy evaluated that war from the standpoint of carrying out a “preemptive strike” on the Jihad movement because it had deviate from the “track” of calm, so the campaign was to restore it to it. Halevy claimed at the time that the resistance in the Gaza Strip emerged deterred from the recent confrontation.
What is happening now in Gaza, with the Palestinian resistance inflicting on the occupation army major losses that it did not expect, and the mutual bombing between Hezbollah and the occupation army, makes it difficult to say that Israel has been able to restore its deterrence power in the face of resistance movements, as restoring deterrence “is not a practical goal because it is not measurable.” According to Major General Tamir Hayman, former official of the Israeli Military Intelligence Service (AMAN).
