[rewrite this title The last moments of Israel and the “90th minute” battle policy ]

In light of the diplomatic moves led by the administration of US President Donald Trump to reach a “settlement” with the Houthis in Yemen, and to send clear signs in which she prefers calm in the Gaza Strip, Israel is moving militarily at an accelerated pace, and announces the start of the first phase of “Gideon vehicles” as someone who is fighting the last rounds in a fateful fight.

This move is not just a transient escalation, but rather is part of a strategy described in the Israeli military circles as “the 90th minute battle”.

This term, which has begun to hesitate in Hebrew analyzes, indicates the pounce tactic in the last moments to achieve the largest amount of field gains before the opportunity window is closed, whether due to diplomatic pressure, or regional understandings that may not serve the goals of Tel Aviv.

What distinguishes this tactic is its focus on speed and decisiveness, as Israel seeks to impose facts on the ground that is difficult to change, or ignore it in any subsequent negotiations.

But the deeper question is: Is this tactic stemming from an Israeli power, or from a feeling of pressure and urgency, as a result of the rapid regional changes? What are the risks that may result from this approach?

Where did this tactic come from?

The tactic known as the “90th minute battle” is not new in the Israeli military doctrine, but today it appears in a special context. According to analyzes published in the “Yedioth Ahronoth” and “Haaretz” newspaper, Israel realizes that American understandings with Iran and the Houthis are going faster than Washington publicly declared.

These understandings, which may include the reduction of sanctions on Tehran or settlements with the Houthis to secure navigation in the Red Sea, may impose on Israel new restrictions, such as “restraint” or even stopping military operations in Gaza before achieving the announced targets, such as: “eliminating Hamas”, or destroying its military capabilities.

In this context, Israel is seeking what military analysts call “imposing field facts under fire.” This means intensifying military operations to destroy the largest possible amount of resistance infrastructure in Gaza, especially the tunnels network in Rafah, and the implementation of qualitative assassinations targeting field leaders or articulated figures in Hamas, and this arm may affect from time to time to Hezbollah.

This strategy also includes an escalation of strikes against goals that it binds to Iran in Yemen, with the aim of scoring concrete achievements that can be marketed internally and externally as “victories” before asking Israel to stop under American or international pressure.

This approach reflects an accurate Israeli reading of political timing. While Washington shows a willingness to negotiate with parties previously classified as “hostile”, Israel feels that the window of free military action may be closed soon. Hence, the focus comes on rapid results that can be used as a pressure card in any future negotiations.

What do Tel Aviv fear?

Israeli concerns are not limited to the possibility of a ceasefire in Gaza, but also extend to more complex scenarios. The most prominent of these concerns is that the American agreement with the Houthis turn into a negotiating model that is later applied with Hamas or Hezbollah, or even with Iran directly.

Such a model may mean the conclusion of regional settlements that go beyond Israel, which loses its role as a central party in formulating security and political equations in the region.

In Israeli security, this possibility is seen as a strategic threat. Israel, which has always relied on its position as a major ally of Washington in the region, is afraid to become a “spectator” in light of American understandings with its opponents.

This concern is exacerbated by the increasing signals that the Trump administration may give priority to its economic and political interests, such as providing navigation in the Red Sea, or reducing regional tensions, at the expense of the announced Israeli targets.

Moreover, there are internal concerns that any settlement concluded without achieving a “clear victory” in Gaza will weaken the position of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu politically. Netanyahu, who faces increasing internal pressure due to the war failures, sees the continued military operations an opportunity to improve his image in front of the Israeli public, especially in light of the legal and political challenges it faces.

Why does Israel seem to be in a hurry now?

There are four main signs that led Israel to raise the pace of its military operations at this stage:

1. American diplomatic progress with the Houthis: recent American advertisements for “positive progress” in negotiations with the Houthis indicate the possibility of the Red Sea Front, which is one of the fronts that occupy Israel militarily and economically. This progress reduces Israel’s ability to use the Houthi threat as an excuse to escalate its operations.
2. Territorial aircraft carrier: The US decision to withdraw the “Truman” aircraft carrier from the region is interpreted in Tel Aviv as a sign that Washington prefers to reduce escalation and reduce its military presence in the region, weakening the American cover of Israeli operations.
3. Domestic warnings of slowdown: In the Knesset and the security establishment, voices that warn that any slowdown in military operations will give Hamas and Iran an opportunity to rearrange their papers and strengthen their positions. These sounds are demanding the use of the remaining time to achieve the greatest harm to enthusiasm.
4. Netanyahu’s political accounts: For Netanyahu, any stop of fighting before achieving the image of a “clear victory” poses a direct threat to the stability of his government. In light of the increasing criticism of his performance in war management, Netanyahu believes that escalating operations may enhance his position in front of his political opponents.

What are the “gains” that Israel tries to seize?

Israel seeks through the “90th minute battle” tactic to achieve a set of concrete and symbolic goals, including:

Dismantling the tunnel network in Rafah

This network is considered the backbone of the capabilities of the Qassam Military Brigades. Its destruction or weakening it will enable Israel to market the image of “completing the mission” in Gaza, even if this image is far from reality.

Proof of intelligence superiority

By carrying out qualitative assassinations targeting leaders in Hamas or Hezbollah, Israel is seeking to restore the prestige of its intelligence apparatus, which received a severe blow after the October 7, 2023 attack.

Click on the Trump administration

Through the escalation of operations, Israel is trying to push the US administration to an embarrassing situation, either by being involved in supporting the escalation or by appearing as someone “let down” his Israeli ally, giving Tel Aviv greater influence in negotiations.

Regional deterrence rehabilitation

Through increasing strikes against Yemeni targets, Israel seeks to send a message to Tehran and its agents that it is still the dominant force in the region.

In the scale: Who has the end decision?

Despite the high pace of Israeli operations, it is clear that the decision to end this war does not occur in the hands of Tel Aviv alone. The decision is shared with Washington as it is the strongest player in the region, so alone the United States has the ability to control the rhythm of escalation or calm through its military and diplomatic support for Israel.

Israel does not want to end the war at this moment, but it realizes that the time is working against it. In light of her inability to achieve a “convincing victory” that meets its strategic ambitions, she resorted to the tactic of “victory for the last minute”, even if this victory is fake or temporary.

But this approach is fraught with risks, as it may lead to opening new fronts instead of closing the list. In the end, the equation remains open to multiple possibilities, as the scene depends on the extent of Israel’s ability to manage this tactic without slipping into a wider war that may not be prepared for it.