In recent weeks, Israel has carried out a series of assassinations, killing several senior leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah in succession. Yet there are reasons to believe that these assassinations, widely celebrated as a show of force today, will strengthen these groups and prove detrimental in the long run to Israel’s security and regional stability.
The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh on Wednesday in Tehran, the Iranian capital, for example, silenced a moderate voice within Hamas’s leadership and likely pushed the group to adopt an even tougher and less conciliatory stance toward Israel. The leader of the group’s political wing, Haniyeh was widely seen as a pragmatic politician. He had negotiated ceasefires in the past and was trying to secure another one before he was killed.
We have seen in the past how a high-profile assassination can have a hardening effect on the group.
Twenty years ago, in March 2004, Israel assassinated Hamas founder and spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, an elderly man confined to a wheelchair, leaves a mosque in Gaza City after dawn prayers. Under Yassin, Hamas was aligned with Saudi Arabia and had limited access to high-quality weapons.
After Yassin’s assassination, Khalid Meshal, a more hawkish figure, took control of Hamas and brought the group closer to Iran. Unlike the Saudis, Iran was willing to supply Hamas with rocket models and other military technology. When Haniyeh succeeded Meshal as Hamas leader in 2017, Hamas was fully under Iranian influence and had built up a formidable arsenal of high-quality weapons.
The same thing happened when Israel targeted the leader of Hezbollah.
In 1992, Israel assassinated Hezbollah Secretary-General Abbas al-Musawi, his wife, and six-year-old son in southern Lebanon. The killings only strengthened the group’s resolve. Al-Musawi’s successor, Hassan Nasrallah, proved far more charismatic, eloquent, and effective. He greatly increased the group’s power and regional influence. Nasrallah was also responsible for the rise of Fuad Shukr, the Hezbollah commander who is credited with obtaining much of the group’s most sophisticated weaponry, from precision-guided missiles to long-range rockets.
The day before Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran, Israel assassinated Shukr in Beirut. And on Thursday, Israel claimed to have killed Hamas military commander Mohammed Deif in an airstrike on southern Gaza on July 13.
Given the unintended consequences of past assassinations, there is little reason to believe that the assassination of either military commander, or of Haniyeh for that matter, would make these groups less formidable enemies for Israel.
History shows that every Israeli assassination of a high-ranking political or military operative, even after initially being hailed as a decisive victory, has eventually led to the slain leader being replaced by someone more determined, more skilled and more hawkish.
Indeed, Israel’s counterterrorism strategy over the past 40 years, which has relied heavily on assassinations, has proven to be a colossal strategic failure.
The 1992 assassination of al-Musawi, for example, was widely considered a strategic mistake by Israel even before it happened. In his book Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations, Ronen Bergman describes how even some Israeli military officials opposed the assassination, arguing that “Hezbollah was not a one-man show and that Musawi was not the most extreme man in its leadership” and warning that he “would be replaced, perhaps by someone more radical.”
Of course, they were right.
Under al-Musawi, Hezbollah was a small militia. Its most powerful weapon was suicide bombings, and it could not effectively push the Israeli army out of Lebanese territory. Once Nasrallah came to power, he tasked Shukr with stepping up the group’s efforts and organizing sophisticated guerrilla attacks, including rocket fire, against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. Shukr’s attacks forced the Israelis to withdraw in 2000, marking their first defeat by an Arab military force.
But Israel failed to learn the lesson of al-Musawi’s assassination, which led to Nasrallah’s rise to power. In 2003, Israel attempted to assassinate Yassin and his then-assistant, Haniyeh. They narrowly escaped a building in Gaza City before it was destroyed by an Israeli airstrike. A year later, Israel succeeded in killing Yassin, which led to the rise of Meshal, who pushed Hamas into an alliance with Iran, which proved disastrous for Israel.
It is not surprising – in fact, almost expected – that when Israel kills a political or military leader of Hezbollah or Hamas, he is replaced by a tougher leader, seeking revenge, not compromise.
History is likely to repeat itself. Meshal is now expected to return to power to replace Haniyeh. He will probably be much less conciliatory in his negotiations with the Israelis.
Assassinations by Israel often have dire consequences beyond simply paving the way for more radical leaders, and these are no exception.
By killing Haniyeh in Tehran, for example, Israel provoked Iran into retaliating.
In April, when Israel assassinated two Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps generals at Iranian diplomatic facilities in Damascus, Tehran responded with a salvo of 300 Iranian drones and ballistic and cruise missiles, becoming the first state to strike Israel in the 21st century. Despite all the help it received from its powerful Western allies and Arab neighbors, at least five ballistic missiles pierced Israel’s defenses.
Israel has struck a high-profile target in Tehran, which is an open insult to Iran’s sovereignty. With this act, Israel has also demonstrated its ability to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran is forced to re-establish its deterrence.
Moreover, Iran’s new president, Massoud Pezeshkian, has been touted as a leader capable of pivoting Iran toward the West. His assassination has given hard-liners in Iran skeptical of a rapprochement a reason to question the new president’s vision, a day after his inauguration.
Ultimately, with its high-profile assassinations, Israel won a symbolic victory, but also emboldened its adversaries to adopt more hawkish positions and prepare the region for a wider war.
Over the past 40 years, Israel has persisted in trying to weaken non-state actors who stage attacks against its forces and people by assassinating their leaders rather than addressing the root causes of political violence, such as occupation, apartheid, failed governance, and Palestinian hopelessness, despair, and anger. The aftermath of October 7 was yet another missed opportunity for Israel to change direction. Assassinations have only served to embolden, anger, and make more determined Israel’s enemies in the past, and they will continue to do so in the present.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Tel Aviv Tribune.
