The war in Ukraine crystallizes tensions between Paris and Berlin.
The Franco-German engine seems to have stalled. How does the war in Ukraine crystallize tensions between Paris and Berlin? How to get the Franco-German tandem back on track?
The announcement went poorly across the Rhine. During the conference on Ukraine in Paris at the end of February 2024, Emmanuel Macron does not exclude the idea of sending ground troops in Ukraine. A few hours later, Olaf Scholz replied from Berlin that “Europe and NATO will not send any soldiers to Ukraine”. “A red rag for Germany”, which fears being seen as “warmongering” in the eyes of Vladimir Putin, according to Dr. Carolyn Moser, research group director at the Max Planck Institute for International Law (Heidelberg) and holder of the Alfred Grosser Chair at Sciences Po.
“Unlike France, the German chancellor cannot commit troops himself. He must consult the Federal Parliament each time,” explains Jacques-Pierre Gougeon, research director at the Institute of International and Strategic Relations (IRIS) and author of “Germany, a challenge for Europe” (Éditions Eyrolles , 2024). He also sees there “a sort of cultural misunderstanding of the neighbor”.
During this same conference, the French president did not miss the opportunity to recall that “many around this table were only considering sending sleeping bags and helmets” to Ukraine. A dig aimed at its German neighbor who announced at the end of January 2022 its intention to send 5,000 helmets in Kyiv but refused to provide weapons.
The situation has changed a lot since then.
After the United States, Germany is today the second largest aid contributor to Ukraine. According to the Kiel Institute, Germany is committed to providing 17 billioneuros aid to Ukraine when France would have only promised 1.8 billion euros.
“There is a sort of communication battle between France and Germany. France initially did not want to communicate the figures. Ultimately, she does it because she realizes that it harms her,” explains Gaspard Schnitzler.
Lack of communication is also a source of tension. Faced with the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Olaf Scholz announces at the end of February 2022 to release an envelope of 100 billion euros to modernize the Bundeswehr. France, “surprised by its ability to put 100 billion euros on the table” regrets not having been informed beforehand, reports Jacques-Pierre Gougeon.
Another thorn in the side of the Franco-German relationship, the European anti-missile shield project European Sky Shield Initiative. Initiated by Germany, the project which brings together 21 NATO countries but does not include France, is made up of German (IRIS-T), American (PATRIOT) and Israeli (Arrow-3) systems. “It was relatively awkward on a diplomatic level, because it was not agreed with France. Some were a bit offended because this initiative included neither France nor French industry,” analyzes Carolyn Moser.
Berlin and Paris are also arguing over the question of European Peace Facility“a sort of common pot of money which is used to buy equipment for Ukraine”, explains Gaspard Schnitzler.
Defense Europe
These dissonances already existed before the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. In 2017, the Emmanuel Macron’s Sorbonne speechin which he calls for an overhaul of European defense and more European sovereignty, remains a dead letter across the Rhine.
The French and German visions of defense Europe fundamentally diverge on one point: the role of NATO.
“For Germany, the defense of Europe is NATO, it will always remain NATO,” asserts Gaspard Schnitzler. American troops are, for example, stationed in Germany and Berlin “participates in sharing the American nuclear deterrent with the stationing of Bomber 61s on its territory,” he assures. Thus, Germany has long been unfavorable to “the idea of developing a European defense and saw it as a form of unnecessary and costly duplication, or even something that could weaken NATO,” he explains.
Series of disagreements
The defense is the culmination of a series of long-standing disagreements between Paris and Berlin.
Historically, the energy question is subject to debate between the two neighbors. While France depends on nuclear power (around 70% of its electricity mix and 20% of its energy mix), Germany closes its last nuclear power plants in 2023. However, the war in Ukraine brings the energy question back to the table because Germany, a large consumer of Russian gas, must seek to obtain its supplies elsewhere.
Another, stone in the shoe of Franco-German relations: the free trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur. “
Also, if Berlin pleads for a signing of this free trade agreement, Paris considers that the “environmental standards are insufficient”, explains Jacques-Pierre Gougeon.
There debt issue is also a source of recurring debates between Paris and Berlin. “France has an extremely high debt rate, 111% of GDPwhile Germany is 65% of GDP”, recalls Jacques-Pierre Gougeon. Furthermore, while the deficit of France is 5.5% and that of Germany 2%, “the Germans have a lot of influence so that Europe commits to a reduction in budgetary deficits”, estimates Jacques-Pierre Gougeon.
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Also, the “Franco-German leadership” seems to be called into question.
First of all, some criticize Paris and Berlin for their past proximity to Moscow. Also, “for the Baltic countries and for Poland, which feel more threatened by Russia because of their geography, the Franco-German couple no longer really has the legitimacy to define European strategy,” believes Jacques-Pierre Gougeon.
The war in Ukraine has also disrupted the distribution of roles and the balance of power within the couple.
The Franco-German couple also seems relegated to the background at a time when Berlin has its eyes turned to the East. In his speech in Prague in August 2022, Olaf Scholz thus pleads for the enlargement of the European Union to the countries of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova for a Europe of 30 or 36 member states. “Undeniably, Europe’s center of gravity will shift towards the East,” predicts Gaspard Schnitzler.
However, the cards are far from being redistributed.
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Several avenues are mentioned to put the Franco-German tandem back on track.
For Carolyn Moser, Berlin and Paris must communicate better while keeping in mind “that it is not enough to speak, you must also speak with the intention of obtaining a result”.
For his part, Jacques-Pierre Gougeon calls for opening the Franco-German relationship to other partners, notably Poland within the framework of the Weimar Triangleand to maintain meetings between France and Germany before important summits.
Gaspard Schnitzler recommends carrying out existing projects such as the future Franco-German battle tankthe MGCS, and the air combat system of the future, the SCAF. It also recommends making effective use of existing means of cooperation, particularly those described in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle of 2019. Finally, he recommends avoiding “communicating through media, but rather within the framework of bilateral meetings”.
