Occupied JerusalemAn investigative investigation by the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper revealed more evidence and evidence confirming that the Israeli army used the “Hannibal Protocol” from the first moments of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle, by firing from the air and artillery towards Palestinian resistance vehicles and Israeli homes in the “Gaza envelope” settlements. During the “Super Nova” music festival, and during the ground incursion into the Gaza Strip, which endangered the lives of Israeli soldiers and civilians and led to the killing of some of them.
According to the investigation published in the “Saturday Supplement” and prepared by investigative journalist and specialist in military and intelligence affairs Ronen Bergman, the “Hannibal” measure was adopted amid a state of chaos and confusion in the field without the soldiers and pilots returning to the high command of the Israeli army and the Chief of Staff.
Hannibal’s soul
The “Hannibal” Protocol has returned to application, which is considered the most controversial matter in the Israeli army, as it allows the prevention of kidnapping even at the expense of killing the kidnapped soldiers and civilians. Since the year 2000, it has been canceled repeatedly, after the majority of the army chiefs of staff had reservations about it. But it has returned to haunt the Israeli army since October 7, after its use was revealed in more than one incident and caused the deaths of soldiers and civilians.
But in the last two weeks, Bergman says, “It has become clear that the Hannibal measure, despite its cancellation, and despite not mentioning it by name, has a swirling spirit that affects the conduct of the war and that terrible Black Saturday, and with the confirmation of its use, it returns and the anger and protest of the families of the kidnapped escalates.”
According to the investigative journalist, the evidence and proofs resolved the controversy and mysteries surrounding the event of the house in which the Israeli hostages were held in Kibbutz Bari, when excerpts were published from an interview conducted by General Barak Hiram, the senior military commander in the “Gaza envelope” area, in which he said that he had ordered the tank. By shooting at the house where 13 Israeli hostages were being held, only one of them survived and the others were likely killed by tank fire.
Secret military order
The investigative investigation revealed a top-secret military order issued by the Israeli Army’s Southern Command to all forces that operated on October 7th in the combat zone in the “Gaza envelope” and the western Negev, to do everything, “at all costs,” in order to prevent the return of Hamas forces to Gaza. .
In Clause No. 7 contained in the secret military order, the following words were clearly stated: “The highest priority for the attack is the defense zone and the prevention of attacks. The withdrawal of enemy forces into the Gaza Strip must not be allowed, and any such attempt must be stopped at all costs.”
Bergman explained that while reviewing the wording of the military order, there was no mention of the “Hannibal Protocol,” but the choice of words in the secret military order at least indicates what was before the eyes of those who drafted the order in order to avoid any legal accountability regarding the use of “Hannibal.”
Israeli fighters destroyed at least 70 vehicles of the elite forces of the Islamic Resistance Movement “Hamas” along the security fence with the Gaza Strip in the hours that followed the issuance of the order, despite estimates of the presence of detained Israeli soldiers and civilians inside the vehicles of the elite forces, according to the investigation.
Israeli Air Force officials said in the course of the investigative investigation that it was clear to them that there was a possibility that the kidnappers would also be harmed, whether they were military or civilian, but there was no other option, because this was the order they received, and also because they believed this order was the right thing. For his work.
Difficult questions
As the dust of the events of “Black Saturday” began to settle, the Israeli journalist says, “Difficult questions began to emerge. How many kidnappers were killed during these hours by Israeli army fire? Was it permissible to give these orders? What would have happened if they had not been given, for better or for worse?” These issues and questions will preoccupy public opinion in Israel for years.”
The drafting of the “Hannibal Protocol” dates back to February 1986 during the Israeli war on Lebanon, when it was drafted by 3 senior officers in the Northern Command of the Israeli army at that time: Major General Yossi Peled, Commander-in-Chief Gabi Ashkenazi, and Intelligence Commander Colonel Yaakov. Amidror.
Commenting on the use of the “Hannibal” Protocol during the events of October 7 and the ground incursion, Amidror, who wrote the original order, said, “The intention was to stop the kidnapping before transporting the kidnapped person to enemy territory, but dropping a bomb from an airplane on a vehicle is exactly what Hannibal’s action is prohibited from doing and doing.” “.
Amidror reviewed what was stated in the text of the “Hannibal Protocol”, saying, “During a kidnapping operation, the main task becomes to rescue our soldiers from the hands of the kidnappers, even at the cost of harming or injuring our soldiers. Light weapons must be fired in order to bring the kidnappers to the ground or arrest them.” “.
He added, “If the car or the kidnappers do not stop, weapons (sniper fire) must be fired at them individually, and deliberately, in order to harm the kidnappers, even if that means harming our soldiers. In any case, everything will be done to stop the car and not let it go.” “By fleeing.”
Officers’ explanations
For his part, Professor Asa Kasher, who drafted what is known as the “Israeli Army Code of Ethics,” said that he was exposed to evidence related to the army’s use of the saying, “A dead soldier is better than a kidnapped soldier.”
According to Kashir, because the document that dealt with the “Hannibal” matter was secret, most of the soldiers who were exposed to the matter, in the southern Lebanon region, as well as in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, heard about the matter and instructions to open fire “from their commanders or from rumors.”
Naturally, Kasher says, “many field military commanders gave their interpretation, often very expansive, of giving the green light to open fire in order to prevent the kidnapping of an IDF soldier at any cost.”
